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SUMMARY 
 
 
Under the 1956 Labour relations Act, parties who were dissatisfied with decisions of 
the then Industrial Court, could appeal to the old Labour Appeal Court, and then if still 
further unhappiness persists, to the former Appellate Division.  Such appeals entailed 
placing before the court the complete record of the Industrial Court, and requesting it 
to decide if on the evidence, it would have come to the same conclusion. Sometimes 
the courts of appeal decide that they would, sometimes that they would not. 
 
When planning the new Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, the Cheadle Commission 
decided that this process was too slow, too technical, too cumbersome and too 
expansive. So it recommended that, at least in the case of the most common 
disputes, the issues should be decided quickly, informally and finally by arbitration. 
Unless the parties agree to private arbitration under the Arbitration Act, 42 of 1956, 
the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration (CCMA) would supply the 
arbitrators, who would exercise their powers, not under agreed terms of reference, 
but under the LRA itself. Like private arbitrators, those of the CCMA are also meant 
to dispose of matters with a minimum of legal formalities (see section 138(1) of the 
LRA). 
 
But the drafters of the LRA did not mean to insulate arbitration awards entirely from 
the watchful eye of the Labour Court.  They therefore specifically provided for review 
of CCMA arbitrations awards in section 145, but they also gave general powers of 
review in section 158(1)(g) respectively of the LRA. 
 
As if the jurisdictional puzzle created by the LRA was not complex enough, the 
legislature added the Promotion of Justice Act 3 of 2000.  It is an attempt to give 
expression to the constitutional right of fair labour practices and the constitutional 
standard of lawfulness and rationality.  If section 145 limits the grounds on which 
commissioners’ actions can be reviewed, or if that section cannot be interpreted to 
reconcile it with the PAJA, it may well be that section 145 cannot pass constitutional 
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muster - unless that section constitutes a limitation compliant with section 36 of the 
Constitution.  That would be for the Constitutional court to decide.  
 
 iv
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Labour Court first had to determine what latitude it has to interfere with CCMA 
awards.  The starting point is section 145 of the Labour Relations Act1 (hereinafter 
“the LRA”).  Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, which is virtually identical to the former 
section, has been the subject of a number of judgments by the High Court.  
Furthermore, the relationship between sections 145 and 158(1)(g) inevitably always 
plays a role in the court’s approach to its review function. 
 
The court’s approach in Carephone v Marcus NO2 means that one is entitled to 
review a commissioner’s arbitration award under section 145 on the same grounds 
provided for by the Constitution.  One does not have to proceed in terms of section 
158(1)(g) to achieve this.  The court held, however, that section 145 does not allow 
consideration of the merits of a decision, as in an appeal.  There is thus no 
mechanism in terms of which one can appeal against an arbitration award. 
 
The Promotion of Justice Act3 (hereinafter “the PAJA”) was meant to give statutory 
muscle to the bones of the administrative justice provisions as set out in section 23 of 
the Constitution.4  The PAJA sets out inter alia the grounds on which administrative 
acts may be reviewed, and compels administrative tribunals and organs to provide 
reasons for their decisions.  There are a number of points on which the provisions of 
PAJA and those of the LRA intersect.  
 
PAJA regulates administrative action.  This means essentially, the conduct of 
statutory organs.  The LRA regulates the actions of the state, in its capacity as 
employer.  Many decisions taken by the state as aforesaid, constitute administrative 
                                            
1  Act 66 of 1995. 
2  [1998] 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC). 
3  Act 3 of 2000. 
4  Act 108 of 1996. 
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action.  So, apart from the jurisdictional uncertainty created by section 157(2) of the 
LRA, which confers concurrent jurisdiction on the Labour and High Courts in cases 
involving the state as employer, there is also now the possibility that such cases 
could be resolved either in the Labour Court under the LRA or the Employment 
Equity Act5 (hereinafter “the EEA”), or in the High Court under the common law or the 
PAJA.  Furthermore the institutions created by the LRA are self-evidently statutory.  
Bargaining Councils and the CCMA exist by virtue of, and function according to the 
provisions of the LRA.  The latter grants the Labour Court power to review these 
organs in terms of the provisions of sections 145 and 158(1)(g) of the LRA.  But the 
CCMA and bargaining councils also seems to fall under the PAJA because their 
powers are statutory. 
 
Chapter 2 contains the general principles of review in terms of section 145 of the 
LRA and also touches on section 33 of the Arbitration Act6 in passing.  Chapter 3 
includes the courts’ approach to errors of law, no jurisdiction, section 158(1)(g), a 
discussion of the review on grounds permissible in common law and the 
development of the common law rules. 
 
Chapter 4 contains an exposition on the Carephone decision.  Chapter 5 discusses 
PAJA.  The discussion is subsequently concluded in Chapter 6. 
                                            
5  Act 55 of 1998. 
6  Act 42 of 1965. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS 
IN TERMS OF SECTION 145 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Section 145 off the LRA sets out the following grounds: 
 
1. Section 145(2)(a)(i):  This section regulates misconduct by the commissioner 
in relation to his duties as arbitrator.  Certain actions by arbitrators will plainly 
amount to misconduct, however, strictly that word is construed.  One can cite, 
as obvious examples, outrageous rudeness to one or other of the parties or 
witnesses, imbibing on duty or closing off during the proceedings.  But the more 
difficult question is whether an arbitrator is guilty of misconduct by making a 
mistake. 
 
2. Section 145(2)(a)(ii):  This section regulates gross irregularity in the conduct of 
the proceedings.  Given the fact that commissioners are task to arbitrate two 
and sometimes three cases a day, it is not surprising that a number of 
procedural irregularities have surfaced in review proceedings. 
 
3. Section 145(2)(a)(iii):  Excess of power by the commissioner is regulated by 
this section.  A commissioner will exceed his/her power when the former stays 
from the ambit of its jurisdiction, or makes a ruling or award beyond their 
powers, or where they make findings that are not justified by the evidence 
which leads him/her to draw inappropriate inferences.  Conversely, a 
commissioner will not exceed his/her jurisdiction or powers if, given a choice of 
remedies, one remedy is chosen above another. 
 
4. Section 145(2)(b):  This situation where either one of the parties to the hearing 
has fraudulently, or by improper means, obtain an arbitration award in its 
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favour.  The taking of a bribe is misconduct and renders the award improperly 
obtained. 
 
2.2 SECTION 33 OF THE ARBITRATION ACT 42 OF 1996 
 
This section is virtually identical to section 145, and has been the subject of a 
number of judgments by the High Court.  These have stressed that by creating 
section 33 the legislature intended to limit judicial interference in the decisions of 
arbitrators to only the most flagrant miscarriages of justice.  So the courts held, eg, 
that “misconduct” meant just that - and not merely errors of law or fact, which the 
English courts have labelled “legal misconduct”.  To justify interference, irregularity 
must be “gross” and some judges ruled, of a procedural nature. 
 
Excess of power only took place when the arbitrator stepped outside the terms of 
reference.  And awards were improperly obtained only when arbitrators allowed 
themselves to be influenced by extraneous considerations, such as some promise of 
reward by one of the parties. 
 
Amalgamated Clothing &Textile Workers Union of SA v Veldspun1 held, that the 
reason why the courts adopt a strict approach when it comes to reviewing the 
decisions of private arbitrations is, that the parties have agreed to the process for the 
obvious benefits it holds, not the least of which are speed and finality.  It held further 
that the parties must put up with the downside of the process, which might include 
the odd mistake by an arbitrator.  To subject an arbitration award to scrutiny on the 
merits (appeal) would not only undermine the consensual nature of the process, but 
also its speed and economy. 
 
By replicating section 33 in section 145, it seems at first glance that the legislature 
intended the Labour Court to adopt the same strict approach when it came to 
reviewing arbitration awards.  But, for reasons best known to themselves’, the 
drafters also conferred on the Labour Court the power to review any function 
performed under the LRA “on any grounds permissible in law” despite section 145 
                                            
1  (1993) 4(10) SALLR 52 (A). 
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see section 158(1)(g).  This created two problems for the court.  Firstly is it bound to 
follow the decisions of the former Supreme Court when it review CCMA awards in 
terms of section 145.  Secondly does section 158(1)(g) allow the court to venture 
beyond the confines of section 145 and consider grounds of review recognised at 
common law and more importantly by the Constitution. 
 
2.3 THE MEANING OF MISCONDUCT 
 
Before it dealt with the second problem, there were indications that the Labour Court 
was not taking as strict a view of the grounds specified in section 145 as the 
Supreme Court had done of the like provisions of the Arbitration Act. 
 
In Reunert Industries t/a Reutech Defence Industries v Naicker2 Judge Landman 
noted that although decisions interpreting the Arbitration Act might provide useful 
guidance, the Labour Court had to remember that civil court judgments under section 
33 of the former act, dealt with voluntary arbitration, and that “there will be less 
reason to base judicial restraint … on the premise that the parties have chosen their 
own judge and must bear the consequences of that choice”.  That the compulsory 
nature of CCMA arbitrations proceedings is affecting the Labour Courts’ approach to 
the interpretation of section 145 is apparent from the reasoning in the judgments so 
far decided. 
 
Certain actions by arbitrators will plainly amount to misconduct, however strictly that 
word is construed.  One can cite, as obvious examples, outrageous rudeness to one 
or other of the parties or witnesses, imbibing on duty, or dosing off during the 
proceedings.  But the more difficult questions is whether an arbitrator is guilty of 
misconduct by making a mistake.  The English courts held that a gross mistake can 
amount to misconduct and, deferring to the sensibilities of arbitrators, have termed 
this “legal misconduct”, a notion firmly rejected by our civil courts. 
 
In Reunert,3 however the court said that, while misconduct did not embrace a 
mistake of law or fact, a gross mistake or carelessness by a commissioner acting as 
                                            
2  (1997) 8(6) SALLR 91 (LC). 
3  Supra. 
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an arbitrator can be indicative of misconduct as contemplated by section 145.  The 
important message laid down in this judgment is that CCMA commissioners, unlike 
private arbitrators are governed by the LRA.  Non-compliance with its provisions will 
render their actions unlawful and the awards that flow from them defective and hence 
reviewable.  So it follows that commissioners are not intended to be the final arbiters 
of questions of law.  This being so, it is possible that the notion of “legal misconduct”, 
rejected by the High Court in cases concerning private arbitration, may be applicable 
when it comes to the review of arbitrations awards by commissioners.  They must in 
short adhere to the provisions of the LRA. 
 
But giving the manner in which the Labourt Court is interpreting the phrase “gross 
irregularity” in the proceedings, debate over the precise meaning of “misconduct” is 
probable academic.  A gross irregularity in any event amounts to misconduct. 
Reunert stressed that the phrase must bear its ordinary meaning, and that the prime 
example would be non-compliance with the rules of natural justice, ie procedural 
irregularity.  But in Mutual & Federal Insurance Co v CCMA4 the court indicated 
plainly that reviewable “gross irregularities” are not limited to those of procedural 
nature. Judge Jali cited Goldfields Investment v City Council of Johannesburg.5
 
“It seems to me [said Schreiner J] that gross irregularity falls into two broad 
classes.  Those that take place openly as part of the conduct of the trial – they 
might be called patent irregularities, and those that take place inside the mind of 
the judicial officer, which are only ascertainable from the reasons given by him 
and which may be called latent …  The crucial question is whether it prevented a 
fair trial of the issues.  If it did prevent a fair trial of issues then it will amount to a 
gross irregularity.  Many patent irregularities have this defect and if from the 
magistrate’s reasons it appears that his mind was not in a state to enable him to 
try the case fairly this will amount to a latent gross irregularity.” 6
 
Apart from its content, a noteworthy aspect of this passage is that it comes from a 
case concerned with a magistrate’s decision, with which a reviewing court is 
generally stricter than that of a private arbitrator.  According to this approach, gross 
irregularity are not limited to procedural errors, but include errors of law and fact that 
are so unreasonable as to warrant the inference that the functionary “has not applied 
                                            
4  [1997] 12 BLLR 1610 (LC). 
5  1938 TPD 551. 
6  Ibid. 
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his mind to the matter in accordance with the behest of the statute”.  The adjective 
“gross” still provides a serious limitation.  The civil courts once held that a “mere 
error” is not reviewable, but that before it will become so a mistake must be so 
“gigantic as to warrant the inference that some other ground of review is present.  
The High Court has dropped this limitation in ordinary review cases, and there are 
signs hat the Labour Court is prepared to do so when assessing unreasonableness 
under section 145. 
 
2.4 THE MEANING OF “GROSS IRREGULARITY” 
 
Given the fact that commissioners are task to arbitrate two and sometimes three 
cases a day, it is not surprising that a number of procedural irregularities have 
surfaced in review proceedings.  Mutual & Federal Insurance Co7 is one such case.  
When the employee had given evidence at the arbitration the employer’s 
representative had sought to draw the commissioner’s attention to the fact that the 
answers furnished by the employee were materially different from that what he had 
said at the disciplinary hearing.  The commissioner, told the employer that this was a 
matter for argument and that the point should be pursued at that juncture.  Not 
content with denying the employer an opportunity to put the conflicting statements to 
the witness in cross-examination, (which is in itself a gross irregularity), the 
commissioner informed the employer when he sought to make his closing argument 
that he need not bother because, he knew what the employer is going to say.  This 
said the court amounted to a gross irregularity.  So, too, did the commissioner’s 
comments that the employer’s representative were “incompetent” and that he “knew 
what the case was about” before the evidence had been presented. 
 
The commissioner’s insistence that an employer’s representative put questions to the 
employee through him was held to amount to a frustration of the right to cross-
examine, that amounted to a gross irregularity see B & D Mines v Sebothana NO.8
 
So too was the failure to put witnesses under oath in Morningside Farm v Van 
Staden NO.9  Perhaps the clearest example of “latent irregularity” yet to come before 
                                            
7  Supra. 
8  1162/97. 
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the court was in Abdul v Cloete NO,10 where a part time commissioner upheld the 
dismissal but order the employer to pay the employee three months salary as from 
the date of dismissal.  He went further and filed an affidavit for purposes of the review 
proceedings in which he said in one breath that he believed that the sanction of 
dismissal had been to harsh and in the next, that the offence of which the employee 
had been found to be guilty had resulted in the irretrievably breakdown of the 
relationship of trust with the employer.  The court found that both the award and the 
supplementary reasons were hopelessly confused and contradictory, and concluded 
that at the time he made his award the arbitrator had failed “to apply his mind to the 
issues before him”.  The court found that the mindlessness exhibited by the arbitrator 
amounted at least to a latent irregularity of the type referred in the Goldfield 
Investment case.  The court then held that it is not sufficiently merely to record a 
number of random and often mutually contradictory observations and then, in 
apparent attempt to resolve all these to conclude that, as was done in this case, an 
award of monetary compensation is appropriate. 
 
The arbitrator said the court, was obliged to resolve apparent contradictions which 
were essential to his decision and reasons and to make findings thereon.  A 
complete failure to make the necessary decisions on findings in a manner that was 
capable of reasonable understanding constituted a gross irregularity as defined in 
section 145 of the LRA. 
 
The failure in the logic of an award is reviewable under section 145 is also apparent 
from Director General Department of Labour v Claasen.11  Here the arbitrator was 
taken to task for finding against the employee because he had “pleaded” that he was 
legitimately entitled to be promoted, when his application contained an express 
averment to that effect. 
 
An award, in short, must be justifiable, which means, according to the court, that the 
decision must be “capable of objective substantiation”.  The award in Shoprite 
                                                                                                                                        
9  (1998) 19 ILJ 1204 (LC). 
10  [1998] 3 BLLR 264 (LC). 
11  J1033/97. 
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Checkers v CCMA12 was found to have fallen lamentably short of that standard.  The 
commissioner had rejected the employer’s evidence of why it had given the 
employee 24 hours notice of the pre-dismissal disciplinary hearing (the fairness of 
which was the sole question reserved for his decision), with these immortal lines: “In 
my opinion the employer shot their own case in the foot.  They gave Selina shorter 
notice than was customarily given.”  If any intrinsic meaning could be given to these 
words, said the court, it was totally unjustified because no evidence had been led 
regarding the notice usually given by the employer for disciplinary hearings. 
 
A commissioner also commits irregularity if he ignores relevant evidence in coming to 
his conclusion.  In Sosha v Buthelezi,13 the court was concerned with the alleged 
unfair failure to promote the employee.  The employer had placed before the 
commissioner evidence that the employee had refused promotion to any arrears 
other than those close to were he currently worked.  By failing even to mention that 
this evidence had been presented, and accordingly not dealing with it, the 
commissioner committed a gross irregularity that amounted to misconduct.  And he 
had exacerbated matters by ordering that the employee should “take corrective 
measures by removing the said unfair labour practices”, without specifying what they 
were and what the employer should do. 
 
Legal Aid Board v John NO,14 provides another example.  In this case the employee 
had alleged that the employer had committed an unfair labour practice (ULP) by 
depriving him of a car allowance.  During the course of the hearing, the 
commissioner had ruled that the issue before him was whether the employer had 
committed an ULP by not giving the employee a hearing before taking away the 
allowance.  Pursuant to this ruling, the commissioner had disallowed evidence from 
the employer on the nature and content of the motor scheme and as to whether the 
employee was entitled to the disputed allowance.  The court held that this amounted 
to an irregularity, as the employee’s entitlement to be heard before the allowance 
was withdrawn could only be determined if it was established that he was entitled to 
it.  Furthermore, the employee had based his claim on item 2(1)(b) of Schedule 7, 
                                            
12  J852/97. 
13  [1997] 12 BLLR 1639 (LC). 
14  [1998] 4 BLLR 400 (LC). 
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which presupposed that the commissioner was obliged to consider whether the car 
scheme constituted a “benefit” within the meaning of that provision.  This he clearly 
could not do without considering evidence regarding the nature of the scheme. 
 
2.5 MEANING OF “EXCEEDS THE COMMISSIONER’S POWERS” 
 
(a) In Reunert Industries15 the court held that a commissioner will exceed his 
powers when he/she strays from the ambit of the commissioner’s jurisdiction, or 
makes a ruling or award beyond the powers of the commissioner: or where the 
commissioner makes findings that are not justified by the evidence which leads 
him /her to draw inappropriate inferences.  Conversely, a commissioner will not 
exceed his/ her jurisdiction or powers if, given a choice of remedies, one 
remedy is chosen above another.  These principles were also applied in Smith 
v CCMA, Theron and Greyhound Coach Services.16
 
(b) It is impossible to give an exhaustive list of acts or the failure to act, which 
would amount to a commissioner exceeding his/her powers.  However Van 
Zyl17 provide the following examples: 
 
(i) where a commissioner awards compensation in excess of the amounts 
prescribed by the LRA or notice pay, which does not fall within the 
remedies available to an employee whose dismissal is arbitrated by the 
CCMA; 
 
(ii) where a commissioner orders the employer to hold a disciplinary hearing; 
 
(iii) where a commissioner accepts jurisdiction to arbitrate a dispute 
concerning organisational rights where the trade union had not fully 
complied with the requirements of section 21(2) of the LRA; 
 
                                            
15  Supra. 
16  [2004] 8 BLLR 73 (LC). 
17  Van Zyl, Schlesinger and Brand CCMA Rules 2nd ed (2005) 193-194. 
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(iv) where a commissioner fails to follows principles laid down by decisions of 
the Labour and Labour Appeal Courts; 
 
(v) where a commissioner misconceived his/her functions as having to 
determine a fair sanction instead of determining whether the dismissal is 
for a fair reason; 
 
(vi) failure to consider whether an employee has shown good cause for a late 
referral of an unfair dismissal dispute for conciliation; and 
 
(vii) where, in the absence of the power to make a final and binding award, a 
commissioner rules at conciliation that the person referring the dispute is 
an employee. 
 
(c) In Le Roux v CCMA18 it was held that one must not be misled by the use of the 
word “exceeded”.  It does not mean that an award can only be set aside if what 
is awarded is greater than that which can permissibly be awarded.  It was held 
further that it simply means that if the award made is one which the 
commissioner had no power to make, then it falls to be set aside as a award in 
excess of the commissioner’s powers. 
 
(d) In Free State Buyers Association t/a Alpha Pharm v SACCAWU,19 it was held 
that a commissioner does not exceed his/her powers by failing to issue an 
arbitration award within 14 days, of the conclusion of the arbitration 
proceedings as enjoined by section 138(7) of the LRA.  It was held further that 
an award, once it has been signed, will be issued once it is made available for 
service and filing.  Section 138 makes provision for an extension of the time 
within which to issue an award, and that section 138(7)(a), in so far as it relates 
to the signature and issuing of the award, is intended to be more of a guideline; 
it is not intended to pre-emptory.  It was held further that, there may, of course 
be circumstances where an award is issued so late that different consequences 
                                            
18  (2000) 21 ILJ 1366 (LC). 
19  (1998) 19 ILJ 1481 (LC). 
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may follow.  In conclusion it was held that if there is substantial compliance with 
the section the arbitration award is not a nullity. 
 
2.6 THE MEANING OF “AN AWARD MUST BE JUSTIFIABLE IN RELATION TO 
THE REASONS GIVEN FOR IT” 
 
(a) In Carephone and also in Malan v Bulbring NO,20 it was held that where an 
award is not “justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it”, the commissioner 
had acted outside the constitutional constraints to which he/she was subject 
and accordingly, the award is reviewable under section 145 of the LRA. 
 
(b) In Rabie v Van Staden,21 the court applied the reasoning in Shoprite Checkers 
v Ramdaw,22 that rationality is a basic requirement of any exercise of public 
power.  Rationality is similar enough to justifiability in the sense understood in 
the Carephone test, to allow the conclusion that the Carephone test remains 
good law.  Thus an arbitration award may be reviewed under section 145 on 
the basis that the outcome is irrational or not justifiable on the basis of the 
reasons given for it. 
 
(c) In McCord Hospital v Sithole,23 it was held that the Labour Court only has to 
determine whether or not, on the basis of the evidential material before the 
CCMA, the award is rationally justifiable in relation to the reasons given 
therefore. 
 
(d) In Adcock Ingram Critical Care v CCMA, Miles, SACWU and Vilikazi,24 it was 
stated that an award is reviewable on the basis of it not being “justifiable” where 
the difference between conclusions of law or fact reached by the tribunal of first 
instance, and those drawn by the reviewing court is so marked as to impinge 
upon the basic norm of the necessity of a fair trial.  It was also held that the 
justifiability criteria extends also to errors of law. 
                                            
20  (2004) 25 ILJ 1377 (LC). 
21  (2004) 25 ILJ 738 (LC). 
22  (2000) 21 ILJ 1232 (LC). 
23  (2003) 24 ILJ 1555 (LC). 
24  (2001) 12(8) SALLR 1 (LAC). 
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 2.7  THE MEANING OF AN “AWARD HAS BEEN IMPROPERLY OBTAINED” 
 
In Stocks Civil Engineering v RIP NO,25 the following were stated that the phrase 
contemplates a situation where the one party to the arbitration has fraudulently, or by 
fraudulently withholding knowledge from the other party that arbitration proceedings 
were to, take place, or by improper means, obtain an arbitration award in its favour.  
The grounds for review may also overlap.  The taking of a bribe is misconduct and 
renders the award improperly obtained. 
 
The phrase attracts a situation where one party to the arbitration has fraudulently, or 
by fraudulently withholding knowledge from the other party that arbitration 
proceedings were to take place26 or by other improper means, example dishonesty or 
by bribery, obtained an award in his or her favour.  It is easily understood that the 
latter is misconduct and renders the award improperly obtained.  The following cases 
attempt to expand on this topic. 
 
2.7.1 DICKSON & BROWN v FISHER’S EXECUTORS27
 
The court declined to define misconduct  and held that it was a word which explained 
itself, but stated that some wrongful or improper conduct was required. 
 
2.7.2 BESTER v EASIGAS28
 
The court discussed earlier cases and held that the meaning of misconduct was not 
limited to dishonesty, but said to be moral turpitude or mala fides. 
 
                                            
25  (2002) 23 ILJ 358 (LAC). 
26  Coetzee v Theron (SA) (1998) 3 LLD 405 (LC). 
27  1915 AD 160. 
28  1993 (1) SA 30 (C) at 35-36. 
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2.7.3 STOCKS CIVIL ENGINEERING v RIP NO29
 
The court held that private arbitrations ought to be reviewed also in the Labour Court 
in terms of the norms of section 33 (1) of the Arbitration Act, and that this is the 
correct approach.30
 
The court held further that, in dissecting the grounds in the latter section, it was clear 
that the first three relate to the manner in which the arbitrator functioned, not to the 
outcome of the arbitration.  The fourth ground, it held further, for example, where the 
award was improperly obtained, is also a ground which relates to function; and 
further that where the arbitrator seriously reneges on his duties it can be classified as 
misconduct or a gross irregularity in the proceedings.31
 
The court concluded on this score that, it will be entitled to review to determine 
whether an arbitrator functioned as aforesaid in the way he contracted to do, namely 
by acting honestly, duly considering all the evidence before him and having due 
regard to the applicable legal principles. It held further that if he does this, but arrives 
at wrong conclusions, so be it; but if he does not and shirks his duties, he is 
effectively malfunctioning as an arbitrator and reneges on the agreement under 
which he was appointed.  His award, held the court, will then be tainted and 
reviewable.32
 
                                            
29  (2002) 23 ILJ 358 (LAC). 
30  At 378 paras 23-24. 
31  At 385 para 51. 
32  At 385 para 52. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MISCELLANEOUS REVIEW GROUNDS 
 
 
This chapter deals with the courts’ approach to, errors of law, no jurisdiction, section 
158(1)(g), review on grounds permissible in common law and the development of the 
common law rules. 
 
3.1 ERRORS OF LAW 
 
What about pure errors of law, which have traditionally been held to be beyond 
review?  
 
(a) In Mlaba v Masonite (Africa) (Pty) Ltd,1 the court indicated that it is also 
prepared to classify them as gross irregularities if they lead a commissioner 
down the wrong path entirely.  Here the employee had been dismissed for 
refusing to comply with working hours that contravened the provisions of the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act (hereinafter “the BCEA”).2  The court held 
that since the employee was dismissed for insubordination, the first question 
was whether the instruction was lawful.  The commissioner had failed even to 
consider this.  The court held that this could only indicate that he was unaware 
of the applicable provisions of the BCEA.  If he had applied the relevant 
sections, he would not have found that the employee was guilty of 
insubordination.  The employer was accordingly ordered to re-instate the 
employee. 
 
(b) In Rustenburg Platinium Mines v CCMA NO,3 the court set aside a decision by 
a commissioner, to grant condonation for the late referral of the dispute on the 
basis that he had completely disregarded the applicable legal principles and 
                                            
1  [1998] 3 BLLR 291 (LC). 
2  Act 75 of 1997. 
3  [1997] 11 BLLR 1475 (LC). 
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allowed himself to be influenced solely by the “attitude of the employee”, by 
which was meant his determination to proceed with the application. 
 
(c) The court went still further in Standard Bank of South Africa v CCMA.4  Here 
the arbitrator had found that the employer had unfairly dismissed the employee, 
a senior official who was in charge of attendance registers, even though she 
had correctly been found guilty of falsifying her own register and fraudulently 
claiming overtime.  The reason for this finding was that dismissal was too harsh 
a sanction in the circumstances.  Not so, said that court.  The employee had by 
her conduct committed an offence which carried a possible penalty of 
dismissal.  She was in a position of trust, and it was trite that employee’s could 
be dismissed if they did anything incompatible with the due and faithful 
discharge of their duties.  The court added: “There is no indication whatsoever 
in the award that [the commissioner] took into consideration the strong line of 
authorities (that confirmed the importance of trust to the employment 
relationship), or that he had regard to the particular needs of the applicant as 
an employer in the banking industry.  There is simply nothing to suggest that he 
weighed as part of his reasoning, the code of conduct and disciplinary 
provisions to which I have referred.” 
 
And further that:  “Where as in this case, there is clearly established principles 
in our law, that bears on the circumstances then in question, parties should be 
able to participate in arbitration proceedings under the auspices of the CCMA, 
with the confidence that such principles will be recognised and taken into 
consideration.”5
 
This judgment makes it clear that to avoid committing misconduct or a gross 
irregularity in the proceedings (of the latent type) a commissioner, is required not only 
to adhere to the rules of the LRA, but also to have regard to the guidelines laid down 
by the courts. 
 
                                            
4  (1998) 9 (5) SALLR 96 (LC). 
5  At 106 para 48. 
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3.2  NO JURISDICTION 
3.2.1 COMMISSIONERS EXCEED THEIR POWERS IF THEY MISTAKENLY 
ASSUME JURISDICTION 
 
In NUMSA v Zeuna Starker,6 the commissioner concerned was required to decide 
whether the CCMA had jurisdiction over a dismissal dispute which the employer 
alleged arose prior to the implementation of the LRA, and the union alleged arose 
afterwards.  The commissioner considered the written representations of the parties 
and decided that the CCMA did not have jurisdiction.  The latter, said the court, had 
gone further than he was required to do; his duty was merely to make a finding on 
when the dispute as framed by the union had arisen.  By going further and accepting 
the employer’s version, he exceeded his powers. 
 
In Quality Workware Manufacturing Co v Commissioner Adair,7 the employee had 
been retrenched prior to the implementation of the LRA, but had raised a dispute 
concerning his entitlement to severance pay after 11 November 1996.  The 
commissioner accepted as the date on which the dispute had arisen, the time when 
the employee had lodged it with the CCMA.  But said the court, the mere fact that a 
new statutory regime had come into force did not have the effect of dividing what was 
essentially one dispute into two. 
 
3.2.2 IS THE LABOUR COURT ALWAYS CORRECT WHEN IT DECIDES THAT 
THE CCMA LACKS JURISDICTION? 
  
In Speciality Stores v SACCAWU,8 Judge Zondo found that the CCMA did not have 
the power to decide what a “workplace” was when it entertained disputes about 
organisational rights under section 21 of the LRA.  He thereupon decided for it in an 
urgent application launched by the employer.  His ruling that the places in which the 
union claimed organisational rights, were not workplaces as defined effectively put an 
end to the dispute.  On appeal against this decision in SACCAWU v Speciality 
Stores,9 the union argued that the CCMA indeed had such competence.  Although 
                                            
6  [1997] 12 BLLR 1629 (LC). 
7  [1998] 4 BLLR 419 (LC). 
8  [1997] 8 BLLR 1099 (LC). 
9  [1998] 4 BLLR 352 (LAC). 
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not emanating from a review proper, the remarks of the LAC in this matter provide an 
important insight into its approach towards the powers of the CCMA. 
 
Writing for an unanimous court, DJP Froneman began by remarking that since the 
CCMA was a statutory body, it could perform its functions only if the jurisdictional 
preconditions laid down by the relevant provisions of the LRA existed.  These had to 
be determined by reference to the LRA and “other accepted principles of law”, by 
which he meant those of the common law and the Constitution. 
 
The court held further that a distinction had to be drawn between “jurisdictional facts” 
that could be objectively determined and those which the administrative authority was 
given the exclusive power to determine.  Where the precondition was an objective 
fact or question of law, the administrative agency’s decision that it existed could be 
reviewed by the court, and if found to be incorrect, set aside.  But this did not 
preclude the administrative authority from determining it’s own jurisdiction, subject to 
review if it was wrong.  The court concluded that the dispute should therefore have 
been referred to the CCMA, and the commissioner should have been permitted to 
decided whether the workplaces concerned fell within the statutory definition.  Only 
then should the matter have been referred to the Labour Court for review. 
 
3.3 SECTION 158(1)(g) OF THE LRA 
 
(a) What emerges from the above judgments is that the Labour Court has taken a 
fairly liberal view of the grounds specified in section 145 of the LRA.  But is it 
confined to these, or can it go further and apply the wider grounds that are 
recognised by the common law and provided for in the Constitution?  This 
answer is of great importance because while the civil courts were limiting the 
interpretation of section 33 of the Arbitration Act, they were expanding the 
grounds upon which they could review the acts of statutory bodies under the 
common law.  The drafters of the Constitution expanded these grounds still 
further when they gave every body a right to administrative action that is 
“justifiable according to the reasons give”.  The Labour Court initially followed, 
and is still following a somewhat ambivalent approach towards the problematic 
relationship between sections 145 and 158(1)(g). 
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 (b) In Edgars Stores v Director, CCMA,10 the applicant sought to persuade the 
court that a commissioner’s ruling that the employer had unfairly dismissed an 
employee for taking leave without authorisation was unreasonable and hence 
reviewable.  This was a bold line of attack, as it came close to asking the court 
to assess the merits of the case.  But the applicant urged the court could do so 
as the arbitration award was an exercise of statutory power and subject to the 
normal grounds of attack afforded by the common law and the Constitution.  
These included unreasonableness of a form, which might not be “gross” but 
which, it was submitted, led the commissioner to an unjustifiable conclusion. 
 
Under the common law, unreasonableness includes irrationality, which the 
courts’ have found exists when a statutory functionary fails to take account of 
relevant evidence or has regard to irrelevant evidence or immaterial 
considerations, or draws illogical considerations from the evidence that is 
considered. 
 
Judge Revelas conceded that the common law grounds of review had been 
relaxed to include mere unreasonableness as a ground of review, and that 
section 158(1)(g) would permit the court to review functions performed under 
the LRA on that ground.  But she noted that section 145 expressly limited the 
scope of review of the arbitration proceedings to very narrow grounds.  She 
added  
 
“In my view the phrase, ‘despite section 145’ found in section 158(1)(g), 
should be construed to mean nothing more than despite the review of 
arbitrations awards on very narrow grounds in terms of section 145 all other 
acts[ which are not arbitrations awards] can be reviewed on any basis 
permissible in law, that is, on the wider basis permissible such as the basis 
of unreasonableness”.11
 
(c) The court then referred to the contextual and policy factors which are clearly 
indicators of a legislative intent to restrict reviews of CCMA awards, to the 
narrow grounds specified in section 145.  But the fear that application of the 
                                            
10  [1998] 1 BLLR 34 (LC). 
11  At 41 para H. 
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wider common law and Constitutional grounds would lead the court, “in effect 
deciding disputes” appears, with respect, to overlook the purpose of common 
law review.  However, wide the grounds that have been developed under these 
regimes may be, a rose remains a rose.  A court is simply permitted to ask 
whether the award is unreasonable, without having to take the further and 
essentially artificial step of asking whether it was so “grossly” unreasonable that 
it was symptomatic of some further defect, such as a complete failure to apply 
the mind.  The fact was that the court was confronted with a challenge that 
went, not to some identifiable error of law or procedure but to the essentially 
subjective realm of whether the sanction of dismissal was appropriate given the 
admitted misconduct of the employee.  That was why the applicant had to rely 
on “mere” unreasonableness.  The court held then that since the commissioner 
had committed neither “misconduct” nor a “gross irregularity”, his award could 
not be interfered with. 
 
(d) The Edgars approach was in any event short lived, because a few weeks later 
Kynoch Feeds v CCMA12 was decided.  The court was confronted with a similar 
challenge, this time against a decision of the commissioner that the 
retrenchment of an employee was unfair even though he had refused an 
alternative position in another area because his wife could not find work there.  
Judge Revelas decided that her decision in Edgars was “clearly wrong”, and 
she now noted that the LRA called upon any person applying it to interpret its 
provisions in compliance with the Constitution, which in turn required courts’ 
interpreting legislation or developing the common law to promote the spirit 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights and conferred a right to administrative 
action which is “justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it”. 
 
(e) She now conceded that the policy considerations she had cited in Edgars could 
never outweigh the rights afforded in the Constitution.  On the contrary there 
were policy considerations that compelled a court to apply section 158(1)(g) to 
CCMA awards.  One of these was that although the wide grounds might 
promote more interference by the court, it would be “beneficial” for all interested 
                                            
12  [1998] 4 BLLR 384 (LC). 
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parties if there were to develop a strong body of guidelines and principles to be 
followed by commissioners.  This said the court would “serve as an educational 
process”. 
 
3.4 REVIEWS ON GROUNDS PERMISSIBLE IN COMMON LAW 
 
In Hira v Booysen13 the court has considered and confirmed the position relating to 
common law reviews as follows: 
 
(a) Generally speaking, the dictum in Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v 
Johannesburg Town Council14 applies.  This means that the non-performance 
or wrong performance of a statutory duty or power by the person or body 
entrusted with the duty or power will entitle persons injured or aggrieved 
thereby to approach the court for relief by way of common law review. 
 
(b) Where the duty or power is essentially a decision-making one and the person 
or tribunal has taken a decision, the grounds upon which the court may, in the 
exercise of its common-law review jurisdiction, interfere with the decision are 
limited.  These grounds are set forth in Johannesburg Stock Exchange v 
Witwatersrand Nigel15 as follows: 
 
(i) where the person or tribunal concerned failed to apply his or her mind to 
the relevant issues in accordance with the ‘behests of the statute and the 
tenets of natural justice; 
 
(ii) the decision was arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously; 
 
(iii) the decision was arrived at mala fide; 
 
(iv) the decision was arrived at as a result  of unwarranted adherence to a 
fixed principle or in order to further an ulterior or improper purpose; 
                                            
13  1992 (4) SA 69 (A) at 93A-94A. 
14  1903 TS 111 at 115. 
15  1988 (3) SA 132 (A) at 152A-E. 
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 (v) the person or the tribunal misconceived the nature of the discretion 
conferred upon him or her and took into account irrelevant considerations 
or ignored relevant ones; 
 
(vi)  the decision of the person or the tribunal was so grossly unreasonable as 
to warrant the inference that he or she had failed to apply his or her mind 
to the matter in the manner aforestated; and 
 
(vii) some of the stated grounds may overlap. 
 
(c) Where the complaint is that the tribunal has committed a material error of law, 
then the reviewability of the decision will depend upon whether or not the 
legislature intended the tribunal to have exclusive authority to decide the 
question of law concerned.  This then becomes a matter of the construction of 
the statute conferring the power of decision. 
 
(d) Where the powers or functions exercised by the tribunal is of a purely judicial 
nature, for example, where it is merely required to decide whether or not a 
person’s conduct falls within a defined and objectively ascertainable statutory 
criterion, then the court will be slow to conclude that the tribunal is intended to 
have exclusive jurisdiction to decide all questions, including the meaning to be 
attached to the statutory criterion, and that a misrepresentation of the statutory 
criterion will not render the decision assailable by way of common law review. 
In a particular case, it may appear that the tribunal was intended to have such 
exclusive jurisdiction, but then the legislative intent must be clear. 
 
(e) Whether or not an erroneous interpretation of a statutory criterion, such as is 
referred to in the previous paragraph, ie where the question of interpretation is 
not left to the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal concerned, renders the 
decision invalid, depends on its materiality.  If, for instance the facts found by 
the tribunal are such as to justify its decision even on a correct interpretation of 
the statutory criterion, then, normally, ie in the absence of some other review 
ground there would be no ground for interference. 
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 Aliter if applying the correct criterion, there are no facts upon which the decision 
can reasonably be justified.  In the latter type of case, it may justifiably be said 
that by reason of its error of law, the tribunal “asked itself the wrong questions”, 
or “applied the wrong test” or “based its decision on some matter not prescribed 
for its decision”, or “failed to apply its mind to the relevant issues in accordance 
with the behest of the statute” culminating in its decision being set aside on 
review. 
 
(f) In cases where the decision of the tribunal is of a discretionary rather than 
purely judicial nature for example, where it is required to take into account 
considerations of policy or desirability in the general interest or where opinion 
or estimation plays an important role, the general approach to ascertaining the 
legislative intent may be somewhat different.   
 
3.5  DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW RULES 
 
Firstly is the expanded view of the concept of unreasonableness, which was judicially 
initiated in Theron v Ring van Wellington van die NG Sendingkerk in Suid-Afrika,16 
where the court held that a contractual tribunal can be subject to a standard of 
reasonableness: which was adopted by the Labour Court in Edgars Stores v Director 
of the CCMA, Mias NO, SACAWU and Matyobeni.17  The court agreed that the 
earlier common law test of “gross unreasonableness”, previously applicable with 
regard to the judicial review of administrative action, had under the new constitutional 
order now been replaced by the less stringent test of “unreasonableness”.  The court 
was therefore able to review all acts referred to in section 158(1)(g) of the LRA, on 
the basis of “unreasonableness”.  
 
The second development is that the Hira judgment was handed down before the 
interim and final Constitutions were operative.  Section 39(2) of Act 108 of 1996 
mandates the court, when developing the common law, to promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights, including the right to fair administrative action.  
                                            
16  1976 (2) SA 1 (A). 
17  (1998) 19 ILJ 350 (LC). 
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Therefore, section 158(1)(g) of the LRA must be interpreted to give effect to the 
former section of the Constitution. 
 
In this context, the Labour Court in Portnet v La Grange18 has held that its powers to 
review dispute resolution functions include section 33 of the Constitution in that the 
administrative action must be justifiable in relation to reasons given for it. 
 
                                            
18  (1999) 20 ILJ 916 (LC). 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE CAREPHONE DECISION 
 
 
4.1  BACKGROUND 
 
An important issue raised by the Labour Court in review applications, was concerned 
with how far the courts should go in substituting its own view of how particular 
matters should have been handled for that of commissioners responsible for the 
initial decision.  Mindful of the constraints the courts have generally imposed on 
themselves when entertaining applications for review, as opposed to appeals, the 
decisions on review applications highlight the success rate of those who challenged 
the CCMA which was higher than many had imagined possible.   
 
The overwhelming majority of Labour Court judges took the view that they were not 
limited to the specific and limited grounds set out in section 145 of the LRA, but could 
invoke the wider common law and constitutional grounds of review by virtue of 
section 158(1)(g).  This activism of some of the judges was noted with alarm by 
many.1  To the more conservative judges in this respect, the principle concerned was 
that an activist approach could open the proverbial floodgates and paralyze the new 
dispute resolution system, with the kind of backlogs that the Cheadle Commission 
intended to avoid when it drafted the 1995 LRA.2
 
The Labour Appeal Court and Parliament are the only two institutions that can 
reverse this activism.  I submit therefore, that this is why the seminal judgment in the 
Labour Appeal Court case of Carephone v Marcus was awaited with such abated 
breath. It was generally expected that, by resolving the disputed over the relationship 
between sections 145 and 158(1)(g) the court would set clear guidelines for future 
cases. 
 
                                            
1  For example, Judges Revelas, Basson, Landman and acting Judges Tip and Pretorius. 
2  For example, Judge Mlambo. 
 25
Of the Labour Court judges, Mlambo J was one who steadfastly held the view that 
applications for review of CCMA arbitrations awards must be brought under section 
145.3  It was therefore fitting that his judgment in the court a quo afforded the Labour 
Appeal Court the opportunity to settle this debate. 
 
The facts that were before Mlambo J, was that the company had sought to persuade 
the judge to set aside a commissioner’s decision not to postpone an arbitration 
hearing.  This was the only way it could think of attacking the outcome of the 
subsequent default proceedings: an order that the individual respondents, eight 
employees who complained that they had been unfairly dismissed, be collectively 
paid R480 000.  Given the facts, the prospects for the review application were, at 
best, exceedingly bleak.  Carephone had already applied for postponements on 
several occasions because its attorney had been unavailable.  When, finally, a 
commissioner heard the matter, an attorney belonging to the same firm, applied for 
yet another postponement because his colleague who handled the case was still 
unavailable due to illness of his child.  The commissioner, quite correctly, noted that 
the attorney was employed by a larger firm that should have found a substitute, and 
ordered the proceedings to commence.  The attorney and employer representative 
present then withdrew in spite of a warning that the case would proceed in their 
absence. 
 
The Labour Court, however sympathetic it might have been to Carephone, would 
have been hard put, indeed, to justify setting aside the commissioner’s decision, 
even under section 158(1)(g).  Mlambo J nevertheless chose to use the occasion 
again to express his concern about the lengths to which his judicial brothers and 
sisters had taken the review process under the latter section.  He singled out, 
especially Standard Bank of SA v CCMA and Checkers v CCMA4 the effect of which, 
he said, would “render section145 ineffectual” and this would never have been 
intended by the legislature.5  This, he added, could never have been the intention of 
the legislature when it had approved these unhappily phrased provisions.  For this 
                                            
3  Carephone v Marcus [1998] 8 BLLR 872 (LC). 
4  [1998] 5 BLLR 510 (LC). 
5  At 875-876 paras I-A. 
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reason, he said, he did not intend to follow the 158(1)(g) path.  This was the facts 
that the Labour Appeal Court was presented with. 
 
I submit that the relationship between the former said sections is confused by the fact 
that section 145 refers specifically to arbitration awards of the CCMA, and is placed 
at the end of a long list of sections devoted to arbitrations proceedings.  It proscribes 
expressly that an award is “defective”, and liable to be set aside by the Court on 
certain specified grounds, namely “misconduct”, a “gross irregularity in the 
proceedings”, or “excess of power by the commissioner”. 
 
On the other hand, section 158(1)(g) is found among the list of powers of the Labour 
Court. It states that the Court may review “the performance or purported performance 
of any function provided for in this Act, or any act or omission of any person or body 
in terms of this Act, on any grounds that are permissible in law”.  As arbitration by the 
CCMA is a function provided for in the LRA, and since the latter section was 
introduced with the words “despite section 145”, it was generally assumed that it, with 
its wider scope of review, subsumed the former.  The only way to give any meaning 
to section 145 was to assume that it was intended to lay down specific time limits for 
bringing applications for the review of CCMA awards. 
 
4.2  THE CAREPHONE DECISION 
 
Froneman DJP, writing for a unanimous Labour Appeal Court began unravelling this 
legislative tangle by setting the LRA and the institutions it has created in their wider 
constitutional backdrop.  All, he noted, ultimately, must succumb to the Constitution, 
draw their competencies from it and accept that they are governed by it. 
 
The CCMA said the Court is an organ of state and, as such, bound directly by the Bill 
of Rights and the statement of basic values and principles governing public 
administration.  What this then in effect means is that, parties who are subject to 
compulsory arbitration under the auspices of the CCMA are entitled to have their 
fundamental rights respected, however extensive the powers granted by the LRA to 
the CCMA may be.  These include the right to lawful and fair administrative action 
that is also “justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it”.  The court held, that the 
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Constitution requires that the process of arbitration for compulsors under the LRA 
must be: 
 
“fair and equitable; that the arbitrator must be impartial and unbiased, that the  
proceedings must be lawful and procedurally fair, that the reasons for the award 
must be given publicity and in writing; that the award must be justifiable in terms 
of those reasons, and that it must be consistent with the fundamental right to fair 
labour practices”.6
 
Ultimately, the Court held that 
 
“there are no express or implied provisions in the LRA to suggest that the powers 
of a commissioner in compulsory arbitration under the LRA may exceed the 
constitutional  constraints on those powers or may be given in conflict with 
constitutional values”.7
 
As Froneman DJP noted, it would have been surprising had there been any such 
provisions.  Taken to its logical conclusion, if there had been, it would have been 
even more surprising had they not been challenged and set aside as 
unconstitutional. 
 
So far, the reasoning is indistinguishable from that of most of the judgments that 
have supported the 158(1)(g) path. Indeed, it is precisely the fact that the CCMA is 
an organ of state and, thus, bound by the requirements of administrative fairness that 
induced, inter alia judges Revelas, Basson and Landman and acting judges Tip and 
Pretorius to assume the Labour Court could not be bound by the limited review 
grounds in section 145.8  Froneman DJP said, herein lay their error.  By assuming 
that section 145 had to be given the strict interpretation that the High Court had 
placed on the like provisions of section 33 of the Arbitration Act in cases like 
Amalgated Textile Workers v Veldspun, the judges of the Labour Court had lost sight 
of the fact that section 145 occurs in a different constitutional and statutory context 
and had to be interpreted in line with the new context. 
 
                                            
6  At 1099 paras G-H. 
7  At 1100 paras G-J. 
8  1994 (1) SA 162 (A). 
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To interpret section 145 in the way in which the then Supreme Court interpreted 
section 33 would mean that section 145 would be unconstitutional.  So, the courts 
are bound to interpret it, as they are bound to interpret any legislative instrument, in a 
manner consistent with the Constitution.  On this score Froneman DJP stated as 
follows: 
 
“It is necessary to interpret s 145 in a manner that is consistent with the 
Constitution.  It is capable of such an interpretation.  If the result means that the 
word ‘despites’ in s 158(1)(g) should be read as subject to, then so be it.  It is a 
lesser evil than ignoring the whole of section 145, including its sensible 
provisions relating to time limits.”9
 
It is my opinion that what the court is saying accords with the rules of interpretation. A 
legislative provision that prima facie is unconstitutional will not be so if the courts 
interpret it in a manner consistent with the Constitution.  If the labour courts were to 
limit the grounds listed in section 145 as the High Court limited the application of 
section 33, as stated above, the former would be unconstitutional.  Because section 
145 must be rescued from its inherent unconstitutionality, it cannot be so interpreted.  
As for the apparent conflict vis à vis sections 145 and 158(1)(g), well, that must 
disappear if section 145 is properly interpreted.  
 
Mlambo J thus, was correct when he held that the review of arbitration proceedings 
under the auspices of the CCMA must proceed only in terms of section 145. 
 
The question that remains is, how then must this section be interpreted – or 
pragmatically put, what review powers does section 145 bestow on the Labour 
Courts?  Froneman’s DJP answer is essentially this: all that are permissible in law.  
He held thus: 
 
“It appears from a number of decisions of the High Court that the effect of, 
particularly, the administrative justice section in the Bill of Rights is seen as 
broadening the scope of judicial review of administrative action.  The peg on 
which the extended scope of review has been hung is the constitutional provision 
that administrative action must be justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it.  
This provision introduces a requirement of rationality in the merits or outcome of 
                                            
9  At 1101 paras D-E. 
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the administrative decision.  This goes beyond mere procedural impropriety as a 
ground of review, or irrationality only as evidence of procedural impropriety.”10
 
Where section 145 refers to “a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration 
proceedings” and “excess of power” it cannot be interpreted, as the High Court has 
tended to interpret the like provisions of the Arbitration Act, to mean only procedural 
irregularities.  Irrational or indefensible decisions are also contemplated.  Viewed as 
such, this means that section 145 and section 158(1)(g) are, in reality, not in conflict 
but for lack of a better word, congruent. 
 
One would by now, have noted that up to this point, Froneman DJP and the judges of 
the Labour Court whom his judgment overrules are speaking with the same tongue.  
The entire thrust of the judgments in which the Labour Court purported to exercise its 
powers in terms of section 158(1)(g) was to broaden the grounds of review to include 
irrationality.  At this juncture, however, the Labour Appeal Court sounds a cautionary 
warning. 
 
“One must be careful not to extend the scope of review for the wrong reasons.”11
 
The court held further that: 
 
“But it would be wrong to read into this section [145] an attempt to abolish the 
distinction between review and appeal.  According to the The New Shorter 
Oxford Dictionary ‘justifiable’ means ’able to be legally or morally justified, able to 
be shown to be just reasonable, or correct; defensible.  It does not mean ‘just’, 
justified’, or ‘correct’.  On its plain meaning the use of the word ‘justifiable’ does 
not ask for the obliteration of the difference between appeal and review.  Neither 
does the LRA itself: it makes a very clear distinction between reviews and 
appeals.”12  
 
One such wrong reason, as the court alluded to above, is the fact that the Labour 
Court has no appeal or original jurisdiction in respect of most of the classes of 
disputes, notably dismissals for misconduct and incapacity, that are reserved for the 
CCMA.  Is it then, unconstitutional that such disputes cannot, in itself, be taken to a 
court of law?  I submit that it is not, because all that the Constitution requires of 
                                            
10  At 1101 paras G-I. 
11  At 1102 para C. 
12  At 1102 paras A-B. 
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administrative bodies that are entrusted with such powers is that they exercise them 
in accordance with the fundamental values of accountability, responsibility and 
openness.  On this score Froneman DJP held, that the Constitution does not purport 
to give reviewing courts the power to perform administrative functions themselves. 
 
Here, of course, lies the danger.  The question that inevitably springs to mind, is at 
what stage can it be said that the Labour Court is, in any given instance, arrogating 
to itself the responsibility of exercising the CCMA’s functions.  Froneman DJP 
concedes that the test is difficult, even impossible, to formulate with any precision 
when it comes to attacks on the “substantive rationality” of CCMA awards ie whether 
the conclusions reached are so aberrant in themselves, or so out of kilter with the 
facts and the law, that they can be said to be defective in one of the senses 
contemplated by section 145, properly interpreted.  The court noted further that, 
various words have been used to describe the kind of defects that relate to merits 
rather than procedure: among them, “reasonableness” (as opposed to “gross 
unreasonableness”), “rationality” and “proportionality”.  But he adds wisely: 
 
“Without denying that the applications of these formulations in particular cases 
may be instructive, I see no need to stray from the concept of justifiability itself.  
To rename it will not make matters any easier.  It seems to me that one will never 
be able to formulate a more specific test other than, in one way or the another, 
asking the question is there a rational objective basis justifying the connection 
made by the administrative decision-maker between the material properly 
available to him and the conclusion he or she eventually arrived at?”13 
(Emphasis added). 
 
I submit that this latter question is the key to the Carephone judgment.  It confirms 
that the Labour Court is permitted to ask whether a commissioner’s award is justified 
by the evidence that was led at the hearing and by the law and principles that the 
latter is required to apply.  The common denominator will always be that, the material 
before commissioners will be based on facts and law.  Where there is no basis in fact 
for the conclusion, it will lack a rational basis.  So, too, will it when the facts point 
obviously to another conclusion.  There will be certain decisions that lend themselves 
to an “objective” evaluation of the link between facts and conclusion.  Examples may 
be whether a person, in fact, was dismissed or when a dismissal occurred.  A 
                                            
13  At 1103 paras A-C. 
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decision based on an incorrect interpretation of the law is also “objectively” 
discernible and breaks the required logical or “justifiable” connection between facts 
and conclusion. 
 
A court does not unduly interfere with the exercise of commissioners’ discretion in 
such cases, because serious errors of law mean that they are not exercising their 
discretion as required by the LRA ie they are exceeding their powers.  Thus mistaken 
findings that the CCMA had jurisdiction,14 or did not need to grant condonation, and a 
purported exercise of a power which the commissioner did not have, were all errors 
that require judicial correction.15
 
However when it comes to “subjective” or value-laden decisions, such as whether 
dismissal is too severe a penalty, whether a rule that has been broken is reasonable, 
or whether an employment relationship was “intolerable”, the basis for that decision 
becomes far less objective.  These are the kind of decisions to which Froneman DJP 
refers when he warns against blurring the distinction between review and appeal.  
This, he says, is not the intended or actual effect of constitutional review.  It is trite 
law, that a reviewing court, unlike one of appeal, should not enter into the “merits” of 
the decision.  But, in terms of the constitutional requirement of “justifiability”, the 
position has changed somewhat because as the judge stated: 
 
“[When] determining whether administrative action is justifiable in terms of the 
reason given for it, value judgments will have to be made which will, almost 
inevitably, involve the considerations of the “merits” of the matter in some way or 
another.  As long as the judge determining this issue is aware that he or she 
enters the merits not in order to substitute his or her own opinion on the 
correctness thereof, but to determine whether the outcome is rationally justifiable, 
the process will be in order.”16
 
This proviso is confirmation that, the grounds of review do, indeed, require judges to 
enter the arena of “the merits”, coupled with a warning that they should be cautious 
when doing so.  It is certainly not a ruling, which some saw as the consequence that 
would follow if the Labour Court were to be bound by section 145, that an irrational 
                                            
14  Quality Workwear Manufacturing v Commissioner Adair [1998] 4 BLLR 419 (LC). 
15  Coyler v Essack and Malan v CCMA [1997] 9 BLLR 1173 (LC). 
16  At 1102 paras I-J. 
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award is unassailable if the commissioner conducted the hearing properly. 
Irrationality remains a ground of review, even if it is now called “unjustifiability”. 
 
Ironically, Mlambo J had himself confirmed this in a judgment handed down about 
two weeks after his own in the court a quo.  This was in Pep Stores v Advocate AP 
Lakano,17 here the employer attacked a commissioner’s decision on both procedural 
and substantive grounds.  After expressing his disagreement with the judgments that 
held that section 158(1)(g) subsumed section 145, he stated the following: 
 
“I want to suggest that in addition to procedural defects, section 145 gives the 
Labour Court the power to enquire whether the award is appropriate within the 
meaning of section 138(9).  The preoccupation of this court in reviewing awards 
on this basis will be whether there has been a failure of justice.  In time the 
Labour Court will have to establish when justice has failed.  For purposes of this 
judgment I want to suggest that an award will be found to be inappropriate if it is 
shown that: (1) the commissioner ignored direct evidence placed before him; (2) 
the commissioner relied on evidence not placed before him; (3) the 
commissioner committed a serious error of law.  Where it is shown that one or 
more or a combination of these factors is present this Court will review an award 
of the commission.”18  
 
Mlambo J goes on to point out that this interpretation of section 145 “diminishes any 
role whatsoever for section 158(1)(g) in the review of awards of the Commission”.  
He is, with respect, correct.  The prime motivation of those who hold that section 
158(1)(g) has any role is to justify resorting to the grounds mentioned by him in Pep 
Stores.  In there is no reason to “sneak” them in under the latter section, the whole 
debate become pointless.  He further confirms how close the seemingly divergent 
judgments were in theory and practice when he singled out Standard Bank19 as an 
example of how the review grounds he endorses in Pep Stores20 should be applied.  
He comments on that score as follows: 
 
“In that matter a commissioner reinstated an employee whom he had found to 
have been deliberately dishonest.  Tip AJ found that the reinstatement of a 
dishonest employee flew in the face of longstanding and consistently applied 
legal principles, which reinforced the trust element in the employment 
relationship.  Tip AJ confirmed that dishonesty breaches the trust element which 
                                            
17  [1998] 9 BLLR 952 (LC). 
18  At 1542 paras A-C. 
19  Supra. 
20  Supra. 
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in turn destroys the employment relationship.  Had the commissioner applied this 
principle he would not have reinstated the employee, especially in the banking 
sector.  I agree fully and, with respect, venture to suggest that that matter could 
and should have been dealt with under section 145.”21 (Emphasis added). 
 
4.3 CAREPHONE DOUBTED 
 
The majority of the Labour Appeal Court in Toyota SA v Radebe22 cast serious 
doubt, on whether the ground of review of an award being justifiable in relation to the 
reasons given could be found within section 145 of the LRA, or that it could be 
imported as an independent ground of review.  The court, however, stopped short of 
overruling the Carephone decision. It has however, not taken long to sow renewed 
confusion, among the masses of judges, about the test to be applied in such matters. 
 
4.4  CAREPHONE NOT FOLLOWED BY SOME OF THE LABOUR COURTS 
 
This confusion alluded to above, was noted, but not dealt with, by Wallis AJ, in 
Naraindath v CCMA.23  In this case it was found that the commissioner had not failed 
the Carephone test.  In Glaxo Welcome v Mashaba,24 Marcus AJ was faced with an 
application for leave to appeal against a judgment he had given earlier in a review 
application which, as he said, was based squarely on the Carephone test and, 
therefore, in the light of the remarks in Toyota,25 needed to be considered by the 
Labour Appeal Court.  He further noted that Carephone,26 in any event, remained 
binding in spite of the obiter doubts expressed about its correctness in Toyota.27
 
However in Shoprite Checkers v Ramdaw,28 Wallis AJ was confronted with another 
review application in which he felt that the issue could no longer be swept aside and 
he took every different view of the Carephone-test and the implications for it of the 
judgments of the Constitutional Court.  The respondents employee’s representative, 
                                            
21  At 1542 paras E-F. 
22  (1999) 10(9) SALLR 87 (LAC); (2000) 21 ILJ 340 (LAC). 
23  [2000] 6 BLLR 716 (LC). 
24  [1999] JOL 5062 (LC). 
25  Supra. 
26  Supra. 
27  Supra. 
28  Supra. 
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invited him to do so, who contended that in the light of what has been said in 
Toyota29 about the Carephone-test,30 the court should regard itself as being limited 
to the strict grounds of review set out in section 145, as discussed in chapter two. 
 
Wallis AJ noted the evident similarities between section 145 and section 33 of the 
Arbitration Act, and the strict interpretations the courts had given the latter section.  
He held further that, according to judicial interpretations of this latter Act, errors of 
fact or law by arbitrators do not amount to reviewable “misconduct” – even if there is 
no evidence apparent from the record that supports the latter’s award.  “Gross 
irregularity” ordinarily relates only to procedural irregularities.  “Excess of power” 
occurs only when arbitrators stray beyond their terms of reference.  This revelation 
by the judge is not new, for the High Court has justified its approach because 
arbitration is chosen by parties as a substitute for litigation and they must accordingly 
live with the errors or even stupidity of the arbitrator, unless the error or stupidity is so 
gross as to bring it within the terms of the exceptions created by the legislature. 
 
However, the axiomatic nugget of the true question should be whether, by adopting 
the language of the Arbitration Act in the formulation of section 145, the legislature 
intended to circumscribe the Labour Court to the same extend as the High Court had 
chosen to circumscribe itself, when reviewing private arbitration awards.  To him, the 
answer was self-evident and flowed from: 
 
“[The] well established canon of statutory interpretation that where the legislature 
deliberately includes language in a statute which in the same or similar context 
had been subject to clear judicial interpretation [the legislature] intends to include 
such language on the basis that it bears the interpretation already given by it to 
the courts.”31
 
He stated further that the court in Carephone had understood that very principle but 
had gone astray, by noting that CCMA awards had been expressly excluded from the 
operation of the Arbitration Act, which he found incomprehensible.  He further noted 
that the former’s major concern was what it perceived to be the dubious 
                                            
29  Supra. 
30  Supra. 
31  At 853 paras C-D. 
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constitutionality of a legislative provision that immunized a statutory tribunal from the 
reach of review on constitutional grounds. 
 
He held further that a decision by a CCMA commissioner is not an administrative act 
but something which has judicial or quasi-judicial characteristics.  The court said: 
 
“Other than the fact that the CCMA is an organ of state acting in terms of 
statutory authority exercising statutory powers, neither of which is decisive as the 
Constitutional Court has made clear, I can find no reason to characterize the 
work of a commissioner of the CCMA presiding over an arbitration in terms of s 
136,138,139 or 141 of the LRA as being administrative action.32  The fact that 
the commissioner is not performing judicial functions under the Constitution and 
does not form part of the judicial arm of the state or come within the judicial 
process (Carephone para [18]) is neither here nor there.  The question is whether 
the conduct of such an arbitration is administrative action and the answer is that 
it is not.”33
 
In conclusion then on this score, he declined to follow the justifiable test regarding 
administrative action which has been adopted in Carephone.  
 
In Volkswagen SA v Brand NO34 it was said that the constitutional barometer which 
applies to a CCMA arbitration is section 34 of the Constitution.  This section reads as 
follows: 
 
“Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by that 
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.”35  
 
The court said, that if section 33 is not applicable to CCMA awards, it follows that 
section 145 of the LRA, which is virtually identical to section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 
ought to be applied in a similar fashion.  Generally the High Court’s interpretation of 
section 33 will inform the interpretation of section 145 of the LRA.  In Shoprite 
Checkers36 it was opined that conduct which under the Arbitration Act warrants the 
setting aside of an arbitration award is as much conduct which should justify the 
                                            
32  At 863 paras I-J. 
33  At 864 paras A-B. 
34  (2001) 22 ILJ 993 (LC). 
35  Act 108 of 1996. 
36  Supra. 
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setting aside of an award made by a commissioner acting in terms of section 145 of 
the LRA. 
 
Section 33(1) of the latter act permits a court to interfere with an award on grounds 
which essentially are directed at a lack of independence, eg bias, corruption, 
impartiality and gross irregularities.  A court will also interfere if there is a lack of 
jurisdiction, arising from various causes, because it destroys the fundamental 
requirement that there be a submission to arbitration.  In the Volkswagen37 case the 
court adopted and applied the narrow or traditional test of review in reviewing the 
commissioner’s award, giving appropriate deference to factual findings but setting the 
award aside for a mistake of law.  However, even on this approach, if CCMA awards 
fall within section 34 of the Constitution then they must be scrutinised to see whether 
the process culminating in the award constitutes a “fair” hearing.  It is not difficult to 
imagine that the Labour Court will hold that a process in which a decision that is 
irrational is handed down, does not constitute a fair hearing. 
 
4.5  CAREPHONE RESTORED BY SHOPRITE CHECKERS v RAMDAW (LAC) 
 
In Mzeku v Volkswagen SA,38 the Labour Appeal Court, considered a review of a 
CCMA commissioners award and apparently seemed to use the Carephone test 
although this was not clearly formulated here. 
 
In Shoprite Checkers (LAC)39 the central issue was whether the Carephone-test was 
correct.  In this latter case, the unanimous court held that the CCMA is a statutory 
body and that its decisions and awards were accordingly reviewable according to the 
“justifiability” standard prescribed in the interim Constitution.  The Labour Appeal 
Court criticized this decision in several respects, in particular for purportedly stating 
that whether a CCMA arbitration is an administrative act is not a relevant question. 
 
                                            
37  Supra. 
38  (2001) 22 ILJ 1575 (LAC). 
39  Supra. 
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However, Zondo JP observed that if the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
(PAJA),40 applied to arbitration awards by the CCMA commissioners, section 6 of 
that Act would be applicable to reviews.  That section provides that an administrative 
action may be reviewed if it is “procedurally unfair” or if the action is not “rationally 
connected to ... the information before the administrator, or the reasons given for it by 
the administrator”.  If, therefore, the PAJA applied to CCMA awards, such awards 
must be “rationally connected to the reasons given for them”.  I submit, that this is 
precisely what the court meant with the Carephone-test, although in that case the 
court used the word “justifiable” because that was the word used in the administrative 
justice provision of the interim Constitution, which was in force at the time. 
 
Although the phrase “justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it” are not carried 
over to the new wording in section 33(1) of the Constitution, which speaks of 
rationality, the Labour Appeal Court stated that: 
 
“I am of the view that, although the terms ‘justifiable’ and ‘rational’ may not, 
strictly speaking be synonymous, they bear a sufficiently similar meaning to 
justify the conclusion that rationality can be said to be accommodated within the 
concept of justifiability as used in Carephone.” 41  
 
Wesley42 noted that it appears that the Labour Appeal Court have missed the 
axiomatic nugget of the dictum in Carephone, where Froneman DJP suggested not 
that the identification of whether an act is administrative action or not is irrelevant, but 
rather that the formal classification of acts as judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative 
is not of assistance in determining whether an act constitutes administrative action in 
terms of section 33 of the Constitution. 
 
Notwithstanding the criticism it leveled at the Carephone-test, the Labour Appeal 
Court held that there is no sound policy reasons to revisit its decision for the following 
reasons. 
 
                                            
40  Act 3 of 2000. 
41  At 1021 paras I-J. 
42  “Review of CCMA Arbitration Awards: Shoprite Checkers v Ramdaw NO” (2001) 22 ILJ 1515. 
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The Court held that the Carephone-test, while perhaps founded on the wrong 
grounds, is nevertheless applicable to CCMA arbitrations on the basis of the decision 
of the Constitutional Court in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of SA: In re ex parte 
Application of the President of RSA.43  Here it was held that the exercise of all public 
power should not be arbitrary.  This, the court held, means that any decision taken in 
the exercise of such power must be “rationally related to the purpose for which it was 
given” and that “the functionary’s decision viewed objectively, [must be] rational”.  
The Labour Appeal Court held that the test of “justifiability” as formulated in the 
Carephone-test is materially the same as that of “rationality” as set out in 
Pharmaceutical,44 and accordingly decided that there was “no warrant to tamper 
with” the Carephone decision.45
 
The Labour Appeal Court, further expressed the view that the PAJA may be 
applicable to CCMA arbitrations, based on the definitions of “administrative action” 
and “decision” in that Act.  As the PAJA provides that administrative action may be 
reviewed inter alia because a decision is not rationally connected to the information 
before the decision-maker or the reasons given for it by the decision-maker, a ground 
of review similar to that in Carephone would thus also be available under the PAJA.46
 
The logical outflow of the Labour Appeal Court’s decision is that the time limits set 
out in section 145 of the LRA remains.  Therefore a review founded on the 
Carephone test, is a review based on a defect set out in the aforesaid section and 
must be brought within six weeks of the award.  The further implication is that the 
court has not proclaimed conclusively on whether section 145 is meant to be a 
comprehensive list of review grounds or not. I submit that it was perceived all most 
completely that this is the case and the Carephone-test locates “justifiability” in the 
aforesaid section. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court, however, has suggested that the PAJA may be a source 
of review grounds in the case of CCMA arbitration, using this escape route as a 
                                            
43  2000 (2) SA 674 (CC). 
44  Supra. 
45  At 1021 paras A-B. 
46  At 1024 paras F-G. 
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reason not to interfere with the Carephone-test even if that decision was wrong.  It 
has been suggested,47 that this suggest that section 145 is not exhaustive.  The 
authors further dissected the Labour Appeal Court in the light of Nicholson’s JA 
separate judgment in Toyota, where he held that the Carephone-test had 
inappropriately forced rationality review into section 145.  He held further that even if 
CCMA arbitrations fall within the scope of section 33 of the Constitution, the proper 
approach would be to accept that rationality review does not form part of section 145 
and then ask whether it nevertheless passes constitutional scrutiny utilizing the 
limitations clause.  If, however, section 145 is not exhaustive of the grounds of review 
of CCMA arbitrations awards then much of the criticism falls away as the need to 
locate rationality review within section 145 does. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court found that that the award “can be criticized in a number of 
respects”, but declined to set aside the award.  It held that something more is 
required than, the fact that, an award is “unsatisfactory” in many respects.  Adcock 
Ingram Critical Care v CCMA 44 Miles, SACAWU and Vilikaza48 held the view that in 
the equation between findings of fact or law, that something more may be that the 
difference between the commissioner’s conclusion and the correct conclusion “is so 
great that it impinges upon the basis norm viz the necessity of a fair trial”.  Prima 
facie this reflects the test for latent irregularity that was set out by Schreiner J in 
Goldfields Investment,49 a test expressly followed by the Labour Appeal Court in 
Cadema Industries v CCMA.50  
 
                                            
47  Landman and Van Niekerk A-36B. 
48  (2001) 12(8) SALLR 1 (LAC). 
49  1938 TPD 551. 
50  (2000) 21 ILJ 2261 (LAC). 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE PROMOTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
JUSTICE ACT 3 OF 2000 
 
 
5.1 ENTER THE PROMOTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE ACT 
 
(a) It has been promulgated to give effect to the right to administrative action that is 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair; the right to written reasons for 
administrative action as contemplated in section 33 of the Constitution, and to 
provide for the institutions, procedures and remedies for judicial review of 
administrative actions.  It does, however, not purpose to repeal other legislation 
providing for the supervision of administrative action.  But if not in conflict with 
the LRA, it may serve as a source of additional review “grounds that are 
permissible in law” as contemplated in section 158(1)(g) for the review of 
certain decisions.  Unless it constitutes a ruling or an arbitration award, in which 
case it may not amount to administrative action, whether or not proceedings 
before the CCMA are subject to the provision of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act (PAJA) is a matter of some controversy. 
 
(b) There are a number of points at which the provisions of PAJA and the LRA 
intersect.  PAJA regulates administrative action, this means essentially, the 
conduct of statutory organs.  The LRA regulates the actions of the state in its 
capacity as employer.  Many decisions taken by the state in this latter role 
constitute administrative action.  So, apart from the jurisdictional uncertainty 
created by section 157(2) of the LRA, which confers concurrent jurisdiction on 
the Labour and High Courts involving the state as employer, there is now also 
the possibility that such cases could be resolved either in the Labour court 
under the LRA or the Employment Equity Act (EEA), or in the High Court under 
the common law or PAJA. 
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(c) The overlap between PAJA and the LRA in the context of review was noted by 
the LAC in Shoprite Checkers v Ramdaw NO1 in which Zondo JP said obiter 
and tentatively that  
 
“Even though the view expressed by this court in Carephone that the 
making of an arbitration award by a CCMA commissioner constitutes an 
administration action might not be correct, it seems to me that the definition 
of ‘administration action’ and of ‘decision’ in section 1 of PAJA may be wide 
enough to include it.  I say this despite the reference in the definition of 
‘decision’ to a decision ‘of an administrative nature’.  It is not necessary to 
express a final view on this issue in this matter.” 
 
(d) Zondo JP referred to Carephone because the central issue in Shoprite 
Checkers was whether the former was correct.  In Carephone it was held that 
the CCMA is a statutory body and that its decisions and awards were 
accordingly reviewable according to the “justifiability” standard prescribed by 
the interim Constitution.  In Shoprite Checkers Zondo JP observed that if the 
PAJA applied to arbitration awards by CCMA commissioners, section 6 of that 
Act would be applicable to reviews.  That section provides that an 
administrative action may be reviewed if it is “procedurally unfair” or if the action 
is not “rationally” connected to the information before the administrator, or the 
reasons given by the administrator.  If, therefore, PAJA applied to CCMA 
awards, such awards must be “rationally connected to the reasons given for 
them”.  This is precisely what the court said in Carephone, although in that case 
the court used the word “justifiable” because that was the word used in the 
administrative justice provision of the interim Constitution, which was in force at 
the time.  Shoprite Checkers left open the question whether the PAJA does in 
fact apply to decisions and awards of the CCMA. 
 
5.2 PSA obo HASCKE v MEC FOR AGRICULTURE 
 
(a) That question came to life in PSA obo Hascke v MEC for Agriculture.2  Here the 
applicants sought to set aside a decision by a CCMA commissioner not to 
condone the late referral of a dispute on the basis that the commissioner had 
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not provided reasons for her decision, as required by PAJA.  The MEC 
contended in limine that insofar as the applicants’ base their case on the PAJA, 
the latter was premature because in terms of that Act applicants are first 
required to request reasons, which they had not done.  The court requested 
counsel to prepare argument on these points, and adjourned overnight.  The 
next day respondent’s counsel found that he was arguing against himself and 
withdrew the point in limine.  This tasked the court to determine whether the 
commissioner‘s decisions were reviewable in terms of section 145.  However, 
the judge felt that the question of whether PAJA applies to labour matters was 
important enough to warrant comment. 
 
(b)  Pillay J noted that the debate over the grounds of review of CCMA awards 
began with the judgment in Carephone.  However, the latter at least settled a 
long debate over whether the CCMA was to review under the more limited 
grounds set out in section 145, or whether the Labour Court could invoke the 
wider common law grounds under section 158(1)(g).  The court held that CCMA 
awards must be reviewed under section 145, but ruled that the grounds set out 
in that provision incorporated “justifiability”.  This settled the law for a while, but 
the boat was rocked by an obiter remark by Nicholson JA in Toyota SA Motors 
v Radebe.3  
 
(c) Here the judge remarked that Carephone might be wrong when it came to the 
review of CCMA arbitration awards.  That comment was jumped on by Wallis 
AJ when he decided Shoprite Checkers v Ramdaw.4  He decided, in effect, that 
Carephone had been overtaken by events, and that it had by then been 
established that CCMA arbitration awards did not constitute administrative 
action and could not be reviewed as such.  If this finding is correct, the grounds 
of review set out in PAJA do not apply to arbitration awards, because PAJA is 
concerned with administrative action.  Apart from the aforesaid remarks in 
Toyota, the Labour Courts have expressed the view that arbitration awards 
were not administrative action in a number of cases, for example Volkswagen 
                                            
3  Supra. 
4  Supra. 
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SA v Brand NO,5 and Netherburn Engineering CC t/a Netherburn Ceramics v 
Mudau.6
 
(d)  According to this view, CCMA awards are reviewable only on the narrow 
grounds excluding justifiability set out in section 145.  As Pillay J correctly 
remarked in Haschke this remains open.  In her view, it should be closed.  She 
pointed out that, before the adoption of the Constitution, the courts relied on 
administrative law principles to protect employees’ rights.  Labour law absorbed 
the notion of rationality and fair process from this source.  However, said the 
court, the Constitution has radically altered the situation.  The rights to fair 
administrative action and the right to fair labour practices are now entrenched 
as distinct rights.  Subsequently, labour rights were specifically codified in the 
LRA, BCEA and EEA (there are others for examples the Skills Development 
Act).  Other labour related statutes, the Public Service Act of 1994, the South 
African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 and the Employment of Educators’ Act 76 
of 1998 have also been amended to regulate labour rights in the public sector.  
 
(e) Thus to the extent the PAJA conflicts with them, it must give way.  Furthermore, 
to the extent that the labour laws do not protect labour rights, recourse must be 
had directly to the constitutional right to fair labour practices.  Given this 
exclusive framework of labour law, Pillay J said that there is no need to rely any 
longer on administrative law in labour law.  In any event, according to the judge, 
arbitration is not an administrative act.  It may have characteristics common to 
“adjudicative administrative acts”.  But arbitration is essentially and alternative 
to litigation.  Simply because the arbitrator acts under the auspices of an 
administrative organ does not alter arbitrations essential character.  It remains 
arbitration.  PAJA cannot therefore apply to arbitrations.  It follows that 
arbitration proceedings must be reviewed under section 145 of the LRA. 
 
(f) PillayJ could discern no difference between rulings, (which in Haschke a ruling 
of condonation was at issue) and arbitration (which in Carephone a refusal to 
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postpone an arbitration was at issue) by the CCMA commissioners.  The court 
held that 
 
“The nature and essential content of the process of issuing rulings are 
similar to arbitration.  As such, they too do not amount to administrative 
action.  If this were not so, then the anomaly that arises is that a ruling made 
in the course of arbitration and which finds itself as one of the grounds of 
review of an award is tested against section 145, whereas other rulings that 
are made outside arbitration, such as rulings on condonation are tested 
against 158(1)(g).”7
 
 The court held further that 
 
“Exercising a choice between PAJA and Labour law is linear.  Labour law is 
polycentric.  Affirmative action is collective bargaining as a planned 
progression towards employment equity.  Disputes arising from it must be 
channelled through the carefully constituted procedure of conciliation 
followed, if necessary by adjudication [or arbitration].  Conciliation seeks to 
address all interests as opposed to determining rights.  Insofar as rights 
have to be determined by adjudication [arbitration] this is accomplished by 
specialists who must give effect to the primary objectives of the laws.  If the 
claim succeeds should, as a matter of policy, such individual action be 
allowed to trump collective bargaining decisions?”8
 
(g) According to Pillay J, the most drastic difference between PAJA and LRA lies in 
the different standards of review required by the two acts.  She said 
 
“the grounds of review under section 145 are misconduct by the 
commissioner, commission of a gross irregularity, acting ultra vires and 
improper obtaining of an award.  The PAJA grounds of review are a 
complete codification of the common law grounds of review.  Any ground not 
specifically mentioned has been captured in the catch all phrase that 
empowers a court to review action that is otherwise unconstitutional or 
unlawful.  Such a comprehensive codification can encourage a mechanical 
checklist mentality when reviewing awards”.9
 
(h) Pillay J fears that the PAJA should encourage a checklist mentality any more 
than that encourage by section 145, is unclear.  However, it is apparent that her 
real concern arises from the effect that she thinks it will have on the restraints 
the courts have traditionally imposed on themselves in review proceedings.  
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9  At 828 paras 28 and 41. 
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PAJA she observed, not only encourages a mechanistic approach, it also urges 
a court do delve into the merits of administrative action.  This because, as the 
PAJA requires and the Constitutional Court has observed in Pharmaceutical 
Manufactures Association of SA: In re ex parte Application of the President of 
RSA,10 lawful and fair administrative action that must be rational. 
 
(i) The result said Pillay J would be that 
 
“if PAJA applies to labour law decisions it could widen the door that 
Carephone opened to the risk of judges substituting their decisions for those 
with which they simply do not agree.  If that happens then the objective of 
speed and finality of dispute resolution will be thwarted”.11
 
And further  
 
“to subject CCMA adjudication to a constitutional test for just administrative 
action could not only broaden the grounds of review and blur the distinction 
between appeal and review even further but also cause parallel streams of 
jurisprudence to develop; one for private and bargaining council adjudication 
and another for CCMA adjudication; one for High Court decisions, and 
another for labour law decisions”.12
 
 These concerns are real, however the fact remains that the Constitution 
imposes a rationality requirement on all administrative functionaries.  If the 
argument that CCMA commissioners should be exempted from that 
requirement is pressed too far some might conclude that they are permitted to 
act irrationally and arbitrarily.  Should irrational awards survive review, the goal 
of effective resolution of labour disputes would hardly be encouraged. 
 
5.3 WESTERN CAPE WORKERS ASSOCIATION v MINISTER OF LABOUR  
 
(a) In this case,13 the applicant was a registered trade union since 1997.  However, 
it thereafter defaulted in complying with the numerous requirements imposed 
on trade unions.  Notably the former failed to submit its audited financial 
                                            
10  Supra. 
11  At 828 para 34. 
12  At 829 para 35. 
13  (2005) 26 ILJ 2221 (LC). 
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statements annually since 1997.  The registrar called upon the applicant and all 
other interested parties to make representations within 60 days as to why it 
should not be deregistered.  Same invitation was dispatched by letter to the 
applicant on 7 July 2004 and published in the Government Gazette on 16 July 
2004. 
 
(b) On 17 November 2004 the Registrar of Trade Unions informed the applicant 
that, despite having been given an opportunity to make representations as to 
why it should not be deregistered, he was not persuaded by same 
representations he had received.  He consequently deregistered the applicant 
on the 18 November 2004.  When acting as he did, he was well within the 
bounds of exercising a reasonable discretion by cancelling registration as there 
had been non-compliance with the law for a protracted period of seven years.  
The applicant was entrusted with public funds and had to account for them 
publically and properly in terms of the legislation.  Pillay J found that the 
registrar’s discretion was unassailable in all the circumstances. 
 
(c)  The applicant brought its appeal in terms of section 111 of the LRA, but 
submitted that this appeal should be dealt in terms of the PAJA.  In support of 
this submission it refers to section 33(3) of the Constitution,14 pertaining to just 
administrative action.  This section provides that national legislation must be 
enacted to give effect to these rights. 
 
(d) Pillay J held that the LRA is national legislation designed for labour disputes, 
including administrative law type disputes arising in labour law.  She held 
further that 
 
“PAJA is also national legislation.  However, I have said elsewhere that 
PAJA does not apply to labour disputes.  Section 210 of the LRA makes it 
clear that if there is any conflict relating to matters dealt with in the LRA 
between the LRA and the provisions of any other law except the 
Constitution, the provisions of the LRA must prevail.  The procedures, time 
limits and the requirements of PAJA differ substantially from the LRA.  The 
LRA, for instance, provides a right of appeal to this court against a decision 
of the registrar, which is a far wider and more generous right than the right 
                                            
14  Act 108 of 1996. 
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of review, which is a narrower and more limited right that PAJA offers.  The 
time limits in PAJA are not the same as those contemplated in the LRA, 
which are tailor made for labour disputes.  In all the circumstances PAJA 
does not apply to this dispute.”15  
 
5.4 SA POLICE UNION v NATIONAL COMMISSIONER OF THE SA POLICE 
SERVICE 
 
(a) In this case,16 the principal thrust of the union’s challenge before the court was 
that based on the right to just administrative action.  It was contended that 
because the SAPS is an organ of the state the decision to scrap the 12 hour 
shift system in favour of the adapted 8-hour shift constituted administrative 
action.  Consequently, the action was reviewable under section 6 of PAJA 
because relevant considerations were not taken into account, it was 
procedurally unfair, arbitrary or capricious and irrational.  The allegation of 
procedural unfairness flows from the commissioner’s admitted failure to consult, 
whereas the allegation of unreasonableness and irrationality arise from the 
contention that the commissioner neglected to give proper and sufficient 
consideration to the needs and circumstances of the employees including their 
family obligations and transport arrangements, as he was required to do in 
terms of regulations 30 and 31 of GN R389 of Gazette 21088 of April 2000. 
 
(b) In order for the union to succeed on this ground they require to show that their 
complaint falls within the purview of protection afforded by the right to just 
administrative action.  Since the introduction of a fundamental constitution in 
1994 there is no longer any doubt that judicial review of administrative action is 
part of our constitutional law.  Section 33 of the Constitution enshrines the 
fundamental right to just administrative action.  It reads: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable 
and procedurally fair.  
 
2. Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative 
action has the right to be given written reasons. 
                                            
15  At 2223 paras 9-11. 
16  (2005) 26 ILJ 2403 (LC). 
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 3. National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and 
must – 
 
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where 
appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal; 
 
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsection 
(1) and (2); and 
 
(c) promote an efficient administration. 
 
Here the court, per Murphy AJ, has held that PAJA is the legislation referred to 
in the aforesaid section. 
 
(c) Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA17 held that under our new 
constitutional order the control of public power is always a constitutional matter.  
The implications of same finding were usefully and succinctly explained by the 
court in Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs18 at paragraph 22 
as follows: 
 
“There are now two systems of law regulating administrative action- 
the common law and the Constitution.  The courts’ power to review 
administrative action no longer flows directly from the common law but 
from PAJA and the Constitution itself.  The ground norm of 
administrative law is now to be found in the first place not in the 
doctrine of ultra vires, nor in the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, 
nor in the common law itself, but in the provisions of PAJA and the 
Constitution, and derives its force from the latter.  The extent to which 
the common law remains relevant to administrative review will have to 
be developed on a case-by-case basis as the courts interpreted and 
apply the provisions of PAJA and the Constitution.” 
 
(d) Section 6 of PAJA identifies the circumstances in which the review of 
administrative action may take place.  In this regard the Constitutional Court 
stated that the provisions of section 6 divulge a clear purpose to codify the 
                                            
17  Supra. 
18  2004 (4) SA 490 (CC). 
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grounds of judicial review and that a cause of action for the judicial review of 
administrative action now ordinarily arises from PAJA, not from the common 
law as in the past. The causes of action prescribed in PAJA are in the main 
those derived from the common law doctrine of ultra vires, natural justice, 
legality and rationality.  Judicial review under PAJA and the Constitution is 
dependant upon the action qualifying as “administrative action”.  In giving 
meaning to that term under section 33 of the Constitution the court has 
distinguished between it and other forms of governmental or state action, such 
as action of a constitutionally empowered legislature - vide Fedsure Life 
Assurance v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council,19 or 
judicial action vide Nel v Le Roux NO.20
 
(e)  In President of the RSA v SA Rugby Football Union,21 the court emphasised 
that not all conduct of state functionaries entrusted with public authority will fall 
to be classified as “administrative action”.  In that instance it drew a distinction 
between the constitutional responsibility of cabinet ministers to ensure the 
implementation of legislation and their responsibility to develop policy and to 
initiate legislation, the former being justiciable administrative action, the latter 
not.  The court concluded as follows: 
 
“It follows that some acts of members of the executive in both the national 
and provincial spheres of government will constitute ‘administrative action’ 
as contemplated by s 33, but not all acts by such members will do so.  
Determining whether an action should be characterised as the 
implementation of legislation or the formulation of policy may be difficult. It 
will depend primarily upon the nature of the power.  A series of 
considerations may be relevant to deciding on which side of the line a 
particular action falls.  The source of the power, though not necessarily 
decisive, is a relevant factor.  So too is the nature of the power, its subject 
matter, whether it involves the exercise of a public duty, and how closely it 
is related on the one hand to policy matters, which are not administrative, 
and on the other hand the implementation of legislation which is.  While the 
subject matter of a power is not relevant to determine whether 
constitutional review is appropriate, it is relevant to determine whether the 
exercise of the power constitutes administrative action for the purposes of 
s 33.  These will need to be drawn carefully in the light of the provisions of 
the Constitution and the overall constitutional purpose of an efficient, 
                                            
19  1999 (1) SA 374 (CC). 
20  1996 (3) SA 562 (CC). 
21  1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC). 
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equitable and ethical public administration.  This can best be done on a 
case by case basis.” 
 
(f) I now turn to determining the meaning of “administrative action”.  Section 1(i) of 
PAJA reads as follows:  
 
“any decision taken or any failure to take a decision, by - 
 
(a) an organ of state, when – 
 
(i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or  a  provincial 
constitution, or 
 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in 
terms of any legislation, 
 
(b) a natural or juristic person other than an organ of state, when 
exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of 
an empowering  provision, which adversely affects the rights of any 
person and which has a direct external effect”. 
 
Thereafter follow various specific exclusions including inter alia legislative, 
judicial and prosecutorial decisions. 
 
(g) Murphy AJ held that in casu the conundrum that needs to be answered was 
whether the commissioner’s decision to introduce the adapted 8-hour shift 
constituted administrative action.  He held further that this exercise must be 
determined with reference to the directions of the Constitutional Court and the 
provisions of PAJA.  He further stated that that SAPS is an organ of state within 
the meaning of section 237 of the Constitution, and that the source of the 
commissioner’s powers in regard to labour relations is in the express terms of 
section 24(1) of the SA Police Service Act 68 of 1995. 
 
(h) This latter section empowers the minister to make regulations in relation to the 
conditions of service of members and labour relations.  Acting in terms of these 
powers, the minister has bestowed the prerogative upon the commissioner to 
determine working hours, which prerogative he may exercise unilaterally, or bi-
laterally, in terms of existing contracts of employment or collective agreements, 
depending on the circumstances.  The court held further that the power was 
indeed derived from a public source, but as the Constitutional Court (see 
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footnote 36) has indicated, the source of the power, while relevant, is not 
necessarily decisive; and further that equally, if not more important are the 
nature of the power, its subject matter and whether it involves the exercise of 
public duty.  
 
(i) The court held further that there was nothing inherently public about setting the 
working hours of police officers.  Nor was there any public law concern present, 
and consequently then held that the matter falls more readily within the domain 
of contractual regulation of private employment relations.  It stated further that 
the nature of the power exercised and the function performed in the setting or 
agreeing of shift times does not relate to the government’s conduct in its 
relationship with its citizenry to which it is accountable in accordance with the 
precepts of representative democracy and governance.  It stated further that 
the powers and functions concerned derive from employment law and are 
circumscribed by the constitutional rights to fair labour practices and to engage 
in collective bargaining.  It held further as follows: 
 
“One is instinctively drawn to the conclusion that the concept of 
administrative action is not intended to embrace acts properly regulated by 
private law.  To render every contractual act of an organ of state a species 
of administrative action carries the risk of imposing burdens upon the state 
not normally encountered by other actors in the private sphere.”22
 
(j) The court concluded then that the powers and functions involved in switching 
the shift arrangements are not of a public nature, and that it reside within the 
commercial or private domain of labour relations.  And further that before a 
decision can fall within the definition of administrative action it has to be one 
“which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has direct, external 
legal effect”.  The court held that the members of SAPS are not persons outside 
of the organ of state, but insiders.  And the commissioner’s decision is an 
internal matter of departmental organization, and consequently held that on this 
ground too, then, the decision is not administrative action. 
 
                                            
22  At 2418 paras D-E. 
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5.5 RUSTENBURG PLATINUM MINES v CCMA 
 
This seminal judgment by the Supreme Court of Appeal23 ventured into the field of 
labour law and criticized the commissioner, the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal 
Court in its respective judgments.  Of note, is the fact that only the Constitutional 
Court has higher standing than the first mentioned court and this judgment will 
therefore have to be considered and applied by all lower courts.  
 
As this case was a test case24 as held by the court I deem it prudent to discuss this 
case in detail. 
 
5.5.1 THE FACTS 
 
In June 2006 the mine dismissed, Mr Sidumo, (the employee) after founding him 
guilty in failing to execute his main duty which was access control and to protect the 
mine’s precious metal product.  His duties entailed an individual private search of 
each person in a cubicle, with close physical inspection, plus a metal detector scan.  
However, the mine’s losses continued unabated, an in response it mounted video 
surveillance of employee performance at various points, including that of the 
employee over a three day period. 
 
This revealed that, of 24 searches in the said period, the latter conducted only one 
properly in accordance with the obligatory search procedures.  This procedures 
required him to search everyone leaving the redressing section according to the 
search procedure which was displayed.  It was found that on eight persons he 
conducted no search at all.  On fifteen persons the search was not done as 
aforesaid.  The video clip finally revealed that the employee allowed some persons to 
sign the search register without conducting any search at all. 
 
At an internal appeal hearing, the factual findings and sanction of dismissal were 
upheld.  The appeal chairperson considered alternatives to the dismissal but found 
                                            
23  Current  Labour Law (2006) pg 219, case no.598/05. 
24  At 241 para 52. 
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none to be appropriate, after he took the abuse of a position of trust and the seniority 
of the employee’s position into account. 
 
The employee thereafter referred an alleged unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA, 
where the commissioner effectively held that: 
 
- the employee was clearly guilty of misconduct and that the mine followed a fair 
procedure in dismissing him but that the dismissal was inappropriate; 
 
- the mine had suffered no loss, and the violation of the rule was unintentional or 
a mistake as argued by the employee; 
 
- the level of dishonesty of the employee was something to consider and that the 
type of offence committed by the employee did not go into the heard of the 
employment relationship, which was grounded on trust. 
 
The mine applied to the Labour Court to review the aforesaid award on the basis 
that: 
 
- there was direct and largely unchallenged evidence that the mine’s yield had 
been low since May 1998; 
 
- over the surveillance period February to May 2000, the metallic yield created a 
revenue loss of R500 000 per day; 
 
- that precious metals were discovered on persons during the surveillance and 
that the mine had experienced theft over the previous 3 to 4 years; and 
 
- the employee was employed to prevent theft and had conducted only a single 
proper search while under surveillance. 
 
It therefore contended that, the award was not justifiable in relation to the material 
that was properly placed before the commissioner and his factual conclusions that he 
arrived at.  It contended further that the commissioner’s finding that the misconduct 
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did not go to the heart of the relationship was irrational and that the latter had 
therefore been so grossly careless as to have committed misconduct and further that 
his failure to apply his mind meant that no fair hearing had occurred and that a gross 
irregularity had been committed and that the absence of a rational connection 
entailed that he had exceeded his powers. 
 
The review application was unsuccessful and the Labour Court, per Revelas J 
effectively held that: 
 
- this was a case of poor performance rather than misconduct; 
 
- the employee had a clean record of almost 15 years standing and was not 
involved in criminal activities and did not commit an transgression that evoked 
dismissal as opposed to any other sanction; 
 
- the commissioner’s preference for corrective or progressive discipline did not 
induce a sense of shock; 
 
- the employee was guilty of poor performance or laziness which was which did 
not justify without prior warning for a first offence after 15 years service; 
 
- there was no evidence that theft had occurred during the employee’s shift; 
 
- the fact that the latter was doing work a more senior employee usually 
performed was also very significant; and  
 
- in the absence of dishonesty, employees who do perform their duties properly 
should not automatically attract the ultimate sanction of dismissal on the basis 
of strict liability, even if they work in a gold mine. 
 
An appeal against the aforesaid court’s decision followed and the Labour Appeal 
Court held that: 
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- three of the commissioner’s findings were found wanting but declined to 
intervene because the three bad reasons had not been the sole basis of the 
award; 
 
- the commissioner had also applied the Code of Good Practice , schedule 8 to 
the LRA and found that it is inappropriate to dismiss an employee for a first 
offence unless the misconduct is serious and of such gravity as to make a 
continued employment relationship intolerable; 
 
- the commissioner had further relied on the employee’s clean record of 14 years 
and suggested that a sanction other than dismissal would be appropriate; 
 
- the mine’s review application failed to challenge the commissioner’s reliance on 
these factors and sustained the latter’s finding that the sanction of dismissal 
was too harsh; and 
 
- for the mine to contend for the first time in argument that long service was 
irrelevant to the breach of a core function was impermissible. 
 
The mine was thereafter granted leave to appeal and this was then the conundrum 
that presented itself before the Supreme Court of Appeal.  An attempt to summarize 
its important findings is set out below.  
 
5.5.2 THE TEST FOR CCMA ARBITRATIONS 
 
The court held that section 158(1)(g) empowered the Labour Court, “despite section 
145”, to review the performance of any function provided for in the LRA “on any 
grounds that are permissible in law” and that this was the status quo until 2002.  In 
2002 “despite” was replaced with “subject to”.  The court held further that the interim 
Constitution25 provided that the fundamental right to administrative action entitled 
every person to administrative action which is justifiable in relation to the reasons 
given for it where any of its rights is affected or threatened. 
                                            
25  Act 200 of 1993 s 24(d). 
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 The court held that the Carephone test had reconciled the aforesaid sections with 
each other and with the administrative justice provisions of the interim Constitution.  It 
held further that the justifiability component of this test and the fact that this test was 
applicable to the review of CCMA decisions was accepted by later judgments of the 
Labour Appeal Court after the decision in Pharmaceutical and after the enactment of 
PAJA.26
 
5.5.3 ENTER THE PAJA 
 
The PAJA came into force on the 30 November 2000, and section 6 thereof set out 
grounds for reviewing administrative action that are more extensive than those 
contained in section 145(2), inclusive of the ground that the administrative action of 
the action itself, must be rationally connected to the information before the 
administrator or the reasons given for it by the latter. 
 
The court found that the Labour Appeal Court in Shoprite considered the aforesaid, 
and accepted that the arbitration awards issued by the CCMA may well attract the 
application of PAJA, but found it unnecessary to decide the aforesaid issue.27
 
The court held that: 
 
“In [its] view, PAJA by necessary implication extend the grounds of review 
available to parties to CCMA arbitrations.  In interpreting the LRA, and the impact 
on it of the later enactment of PAJA, the Constitution obliges us to promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  This means that, without losing 
sight of the specific constitutional objectives of the LRA, and the constitutional 
values it embodies, we must in interpreting it give appropriate recognition to the 
right to administrative justice under the final Constitution and the legislation that 
gives effect to it.”28
 
                                            
26  At 227 para 21. 
27  At 228 para 22. 
28  At 228-229 para 23. 
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It accordingly held that: 
 
“That obligation did not exempt from its ambit previous parliamentary enactments 
that conferred rights of administrative review.  It extended to all of them.  This is 
so even though the LRA is a specialised statute.  Both the Constitution, which 
required Parliament to give general legislative effect to the right to administrative 
justice, and the legislation so enacted, superseded the LRA’s specialized 
enactment within the field.”29
 
The court found that:  
 
“a CCMA commissioner’s arbitral decision constitutes administrative action, 
section 6’s codificatory purpose subsumed the grounds of review in section 
145(2), and PAJA’s constitutional purpose must be taken to override that 
provision’s preceding, more constricted, formulation.”30
 
The court found that as the Constitution does not require the legislation enacted, to 
give effect to the right administrative justice must set out any particular time limits, the 
different time periods in the LRA and PAJA are set in different fields, acknowledging 
that particular needs. 
 
5.5.4 THE CRITICISM OF THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT  
 
In summary form the court held as follows that: 
 
- the LAC was incorrect when it held that the mine was at fault for not attacking 
the commissioner’s reliance on the Code of Good Practice and the employee’s 
clean record in its papers, but only in argument; 
 
- the mine’s true complaint was that the Labour and Appeal courts’ respectively 
held that those factors insulated the commissioner’s award from their 
intervention; 
 
- the LAC failed to apply either the Carephone test or the test as set out in PAJA, 
which respectively required the court to discern whether the commissioner’s 
                                            
29  At 229 para 24. 
30  At 229 para 25. 
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award to reinstate the employee was rationally connected to the information 
properly placed before him and to the reasons he gave for it; 
 
- the LAC failed to refer to the aforesaid case our piece of legislation, but applied 
the incorrect test, when it asked whether or not the commissioner took into 
account relevant considerations that were capable of justifying the final 
decision, despite any defective reasons in the award; 
 
- this test was more akin to the test applied in appeal proceedings, rather than 
the test required in review proceedings; 
 
- the effect of this incorrect approach is that the decisions of commissioners are 
protected from interference, unless there is absolutely no reason capable of 
justifying the outcome; 
 
- what the LAC lost from sight, was the fact that it was required to subject the 
commissioner’s award to process-related analysis, and not to inquire whether 
his decision was capable of being sustained by recourse to other factors 
emerging from the record. 
 
5.5.5 THE CORRECT APPROACH 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal stated that the correct test on review is whether: 
 
- a court applied the Carephone test in the light of PAJA; 
 
- the decision-maker properly exercised the powers entrusted to him or her; 
 
- the scrutiny focused on the process and manner in which the former reached 
the conclusion; 
 
- the reasons giving were preponderantly bad and that bad reasons is unable to 
provide a rational connection to a sustainable outcome; 
 
 59
- the court was alive to the fact that this also applies where it is impossible to 
distinguish the reasons that significantly influence a decision from those that do 
not;  
 
- the court was further alive to the fact that PAJA does not oblige courts to 
randomly select reasons to find some sustenance for a decision, despite poor 
reasons been relied on; 
 
- the court appreciated the fact that commissioners’ must be careful when 
determining whether a workplace sanction imposed by the employer is fair; 
 
- the commissioner must entertain the employer’s sanction with a measure of 
deference; 
 
- the court appreciated the fact that under the LRA it is primarily the function of 
the employer to decide on the proper sanction;  
 
- the commissioner need not be persuaded that dismissal is the only fair 
sanction, in determining whether a dismissal is fair because the statute requires 
only that the employer establish that it is a fair sanction; and 
 
- the fact is further appreciated that although a commissioner may think that a 
different sanction would also be fair, does not justify setting aside the 
employer’s sanction. 
 
The court concluded then that because of the aforesaid the LAC should have set 
aside the commissioner’s award. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Section 33 of the Arbitration Act1 is virtually identical to section 145 of the LRA.  The 
High Court have stressed that by creating the former section the legislature intended 
to limit judicial interference in the decision of arbitrators to only the most plagrant 
miscarriages of justice. 
 
By replicating section 33 in section 145, as aforesaid, it seemed at first glance that 
the legislature intended the Labour Court to adopt the same strict approach when it 
came to reviewing arbitration awards.  But, for reasons best known to themselves, 
the drafters also conferred on the Labour Courts the powers to review any function 
performed under the LRA “on any grounds permissible in law” despite section 145.2
 
Carephone3 settled the long debate over whether the CCMA was subject to review 
under the more limited grounds set out in section 145 of the LRA, or whether the 
Labour Court could invoke the wider common law grounds under section 158(1)(g).  
The court held that CCMA awards must be reviewed under section 145, but ruled 
that the grounds set out in the provision incorporated “justifiability”.  In the Labour 
Appeal Court in Shoprite Checkers,4 the court thought that the view expressed in 
Carephone may not be correct, but in an obiter statement Zondo JP expressed the 
view that if PAJA were applicable to CCMA awards, the definitions of “administrative 
action” and of “decision” in section 1 thereof, may be wide enough to include it.  The 
court could however not make a definite pronouncement on the applicability of PAJA 
to CCMA awards as the dismissal in issue took place prior to the enactment of PAJA. 
 
                                            
1  Act 42 of 1956. 
2  See s 158(1)(g). 
3  Supra. 
4  Supra. 
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The court further held that the view that the test for review as set out in Carephone,5 
while perhaps based on the wrong grounds, is nevertheless applicable to CCMA 
arbitrations on the basis of the decision of the Constitutional Court in the 
Pharmaceutical6 case.  In that case, it was held that the exercise of all public power 
should not be arbitrary.  This, the court held, means that any decision taken in the 
exercise of such power must be “rationally related to the purpose for which the power 
was given” and that “the functionary’s decision, viewed objectively [must be] rational”.  
The Labour Appeal Court held that the test for “justifiability” as espoused in 
Carephone is materially the same as that of “rationality” as set out in Pharmaceutical 
and so concluded that there was not necessity to tamper with the Carephone 
judgment. 
 
The PAJA gives any person the right “to institute action in a court or tribunal for the 
judicial review of an administrative action”, which court or tribunal has the power to 
review the administrative action on the grounds set out in section 6 of it.  One ground 
on which the PAJA might conceivable be held inapplicable to CCMA awards is that 
suggested by both judges Landman and Pillay in the Volkswagen7 and Hascke8 
cases respectively.  That is where the PAJA clashes with section 145 and is to that 
extent “trumped” by virtue of section 210 of the LRA.  However, in terms of the latter, 
the LRA prevails over other Acts only to the extent that they conflict.  Whether the 
PAJA conflicts with section 145 on anything other than purely procedural points 
depends on how the substantive provisions of section 145 should be interpreted. 
 
Where the grounds of section 6 of the PAJA, that does not fall the categories of 
section 145, conflicts with the latter depends on the scope accorded to the notion of 
“irregularity in the proceedings” in section 145(2)(a)(ii) of the LRA. 
 
                                            
5  Supra. 
6  Supra. 
7  Supra. 
8  Supra. 
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On the Carephone9 test, there is no apparent conflict; on the test suggested by the 
Labour Court in Shoprite Checkers,10 there is clear conflict.  In the final analysis, the 
answer can only be determined once this debate is finally resolved. 
 
Our Constitutional Court has held that under our new constitutional order the control 
of public power is always a constitutional matter.  It further also emphasized that not 
all conduct of state functionaries entrusted with public authority will fall to be 
classified as “administrative action”, and as an example draw a distinction between 
the constitutional responsibility of cabinet ministers to ensure the implementation of 
legislation and their responsibility to develop policy and to initiate legislation, the 
former being justiciable administrative action, the latter not. 
 
Our Labour Court has further held that the powers and functions involving in 
switching shift arrangement in the South African Police Service are not of a public 
nature, and that it reside within the commercial or private domain of labour relations.  
And further that before a decision can fall within the definition of administrative action 
it has to be one which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has direct 
external legal effect.  The Labour Court held further that because in that case the 
national commissioner’s decision was an internal matter, to set working hours of 
police officers of departmental organisation, it consequently held that on this ground, 
too, the decision to change the shift system, was not an administrative action. 
 
The definition of administrative action is defined in PAJA and I submit that it should 
be used as barometer to check whether the alleged wrong action falls thereunder. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in its recent judgment of Rustenburg11 criticised the 
Labour Appeal Court, the Labour Court and the CCMA for not giving the employer’s 
sanction a measure of deference; not applying the Carephone12 test or the test in 
PAJA and for applying the incorrect test when it asked whether or not the 
                                            
9  Supra. 
10  Supra. 
11  Supra. 
12  Supra. 
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commissioner took into account relevant considerations that were capable of 
justifying the final decision, despite any defective reasons in the award, respectively. 
 
From the aforesaid, it is clear that the court is allowed to venture beyond the confines 
of section 145 and to consider grounds of review recognized at common law, in the 
PAJA and more importantly, by the Constitution. 
 
The only limitations appear in applying the correct review principles as set out in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment. 
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